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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
1.1 MAIN CONCLUSIONS 
Estimates from an updated version of the Scottish adaptation the Sheffield Alcohol Policy Model 
suggest: 
1. A 50p minimum unit price would be effective in reducing alcohol consumption among 
hazardous and, particularly, harmful drinkers. These consumption reductions would lead to 
reductions in alcohol-related mortality and hospitalisations. 
2. Moderate drinkers would experience only small impacts on their alcohol consumption and 
spending as a result of introducing a 50p minimum unit price. This is because they tend to 
buy alcohol which would be subject to little or no increase in price following introduction of 
the policy.  
3. To achieve the same reduction in alcohol-related deaths among hazardous and harmful 
drinkers as a 50p minimum unit price, a 28% increase in alcohol taxation would be required. 
Compared to a 50p minimum unit price, a 28% increase in alcohol taxes would lead to 
slightly larger reductions in alcohol consumption among moderate and hazardous drinkers 
but smaller reductions in consumption among harmful drinkers and, particularly, harmful 
drinkers in poverty. Harmful drinkers in poverty are the group at greatest risk from their 
alcohol consumption.  
4. Increases in consumer spending on alcohol would be modest under a 50p MUP and spending 
would decline for harmful drinkers in poverty. Larger changes in consumer spending would 
be seen under a 28% tax increase and spending would increase in all groups including among 
harmful drinkers in poverty.  
 
1.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This report was commissioned in 2015 by the Scottish Government in order to appraise the potential 
impact of different minimum unit prices for alcohol and increases in alcohol taxation on levels of 
alcohol consumption, spending on alcohol, Exchequer and retailer revenue and alcohol-related 
health outcomes in Scotland among population subgroups defined baseline level of drinking and 
income.  
 
The specific policies analysed in this report are minimum unit price (MUP) policies with thresholds of 
30p, 40p, 50p, 60p and 70p per unit of alcohol and alcohol tax increases based on the duty and VAT 
rates effective from 23rd March 2015. Levels of tax increases were identified which would achieve 
the same reduction in the following outcomes as a 50p MUP price: 
1. Annual deaths due to alcohol; 
2. Annual deaths due to alcohol among hazardous and harmful drinkers; 
3. Annual deaths due to alcohol among harmful drinkers; 
4. Annual deaths due to alcohol among hazardous and harmful drinkers in poverty; 
5. Annual deaths due to alcohol among harmful drinkers in poverty. 
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1.3 SUMMARY OF MODEL FINDINGS 
 
1.3.1 Baseline alcohol consumption, related harm and purchasing in Scotland 
M1. Analysis of current consumption patterns shows that, within the Scottish population, 14.9% 
do not drink, 60.5% are moderate drinkers, 19.1% are hazardous drinkers and 5.4% are 
harmful drinkers. Of all alcohol drunk in Scotland, hazardous drinkers consume 41.5% and 
harmful drinkers consume 29.4%. 
M2. A smaller proportion of those in poverty are hazardous and harmful drinkers compared to 
those not in poverty (18.6% vs. 25.6%). However, on average, hazardous and harmful 
drinkers in poverty consume more alcohol than those not in poverty.  
M3. Alcohol-related mortality and morbidity is concentrated among those consuming most 
alcohol and among those with lower incomes.  
M4. A 50p minimum unit price would only directly affect products sold for less than 50p per unit. 
Hazardous and harmful drinkers buy more of this cheap alcohol and it accounts for a greater 
share of their alcohol purchases. This is particular true for harmful drinkers in poverty who 
purchase 2,796 units of alcohol per year for less than 50p (62% of their purchases) whereas 
harmful drinkers not in poverty purchase 1,459 units below this threshold (44% of their 
purchase).  
M5.  Harmful drinkers spend a substantial amount of money on alcohol. Harmful drinkers in 
poverty are estimated to spend £2,484 per annum and those not in poverty are estimated to 
spend £2,341 per annum. The equivalent figures for hazardous drinkers are £1,102 and 
£1,204 per annum and for moderate drinkers are £230 and £378.  
1.3.2 Modelled effects of minimum unit pricing 
M6.  Implementing a 50p MUP is estimated to reduce alcohol consumption in Scotland by 3.5% or 
26.3 units per drinker per year. Consumption reductions increase steeply with higher levels 
of MUP (e.g. 0.3% for 30p, 1.4% for 40p, 3.5% for 50p, 6.6% for 60p and 10.6% for 70p). For 
the remainder of this executive summary we focus on 50p as this has been the focus of 
public and policy debate.  
M7. Consumption reductions under a 50p MUP are estimated to be largest among harmful 
drinkers (7.0%, 246.2 units per drinker per year) and hazardous drinkers (2.5%, 35.5 units). 
The smallest effects would be seen among moderate drinkers (1.2%, 3.7 units).  
M8. The absolute difference in consumption reductions between those in poverty and those not 
in poverty are small for moderate drinkers (9.8 vs. 2.7 units per drinker per year). This 
difference is larger for hazardous drinkers (88.1 vs. 29.7 units) and larger again for harmful 
drinkers (680.9 vs. 180.9 units).These results demonstrate the importance of separating 
moderate drinkers in poverty from hazardous and harmful drinkers in poverty when 
considering the equity implications of minimum unit pricing.  
M9.  A 50p MUP is estimated to lead to 2,036 fewer deaths and 38,859 fewer hospitalisations 
during the first 20 years of the policy. After 20 years, when the policy has achieved its full 
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effect, there would be an estimated 121 fewer deaths and 2,042 fewer hospital admissions 
per year. 
M10.  Reductions in mortality are estimated to be largest among harmful drinkers in poverty – the 
group at greatest risk from their drinking. Among this group, at full effect, there would be 
15.3% fewer alcohol-related deaths per year compared to 4.4% fewer among harmful 
drinkers not in poverty. The equivalent reductions among hazardous drinkers are 10.8% and 
4.4%.  
M11. The impact of a 50p MUP on consumer spending is also estimated to vary by consumption 
and poverty status. Annual spending among moderate drinkers would be largely unaffected 
(a 0.5% or £2 increase per annum) and this is the case irrespective of poverty status. Among 
harmful drinkers spending changes are larger both in relative and absolute terms and differ 
between harmful drinkers in poverty (a reduction of 3.5% or £88 per annum) and those not 
in poverty (an increase of 0.8% or £20 per annum).  
M12.  Revenue to the Exchequer would fall by around £15m or 1.3% under a 50p MUP with £12m 
of this reduction attributable to the off-trade and £4m attributable to the on-trade. 
M13.  Revenue to off-trade retailers from alcohol sales would increase by £41m or 9.6% under a 
50p MUP and would fall by £7m or 0.7% for on-trade retailers.  
1.3.3 Modelled effect of alcohol tax increases 
M14.  At full effect, a 50p MUP is estimated to lead to 117 fewer alcohol-related deaths per year 
among hazardous and harmful drinkers. To achieve the same reduction in deaths among 
hazardous and harmful drinkers, an estimated 28% increase in alcohol taxes is required.  
M15.  If reductions in alcohol-related harm in specific population groups are sought, then larger tax 
increases would be required; for example, a 36% tax increase would be required to achieve 
the same reductions in deaths among harmful drinkers as a 50p MUP. This is because MUP 
targets large price increases on those at greatest risk from their drinking while tax increases 
affect all drinkers.  
M16.  Although achieving the same reduction in deaths among hazardous and harmful drinkers as 
a 50p MUP, a 28% tax increase would lead to slightly larger reductions in alcohol 
consumption among moderate and hazardous drinkers but smaller reductions in alcohol 
consumption among harmful drinkers and, particularly, harmful drinkers in poverty. 
M17. Similarly, at full effect, the reductions in deaths under a 28% tax increase would be larger 
among hazardous drinkers and smaller among harmful drinkers, particularly harmful 
drinkers in poverty, than under a 50p MUP price.  
M18. These differences in how death reductions are distributed across the population mean a 50p 
MUP is more effective than a 28% tax increase in reducing alcohol-related health 
inequalities. This is because a 50p MUP better targets the alcohol consumed by harmful 
drinkers on low incomes who are the group at greatest risk from their drinking.  
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M19. Increases in consumer spending on alcohol are estimated to be substantially greater under a 
28% tax increase than a 50p MUP. For example, among moderate drinkers annual per capita 
spending would increase by £2 or 0.5% under a 50p MUP and by £17 or 4.7% under a 28% 
tax increase. For harmful drinkers the annual increases in spending per capita are £6 or 0.2% 
for a 50p MUP and £152 or 6.4% under a 28% tax increase.  
M20. Revenue to the Exchequer is estimated to increase by £209m per annum or 18.4% under a 
28% tax increase. This compares to a £15m per annum or 1.3% decrease under a 50p MUP 
price. The majority of the increase under a 28% tax rise comes from the off-trade (£148m – a 
22.2% increase in off-trade alcohol tax revenue).  
M21. Revenue to retailers is estimated to decline by £63m per annum or 4.6% under a 28% tax 
increase. This compares to an increase of £34m per annum or 2.5% under a 50p MUP. The 
decline in revenue to off-trade retailers under a 28% tax increase is estimated to be £33m 
per annum or 7.7% and for on-trade retailers the decline in revenue is estimated to be £30m 
per annum or 3.2%.  
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2 INTRODUCTION 
 
2.1  BACKGROUND 
The Sheffield Alcohol Research Group (SARG) at Sheffield University have developed the Sheffield 
Alcohol Policy Model (SAPM) over the course of the past decade in order to appraise the potential 
impact of alcohol policies, including pricing policies such as Minimum Unit Pricing (MUP) and 
taxation, as well as restrictions on sales promotions and Alcohol Brief Intervention programmes. 
Whilst SAPM was originally developed for England (1), versions of SAPM have been developed for 
policy appraisals in other countries including Scotland (2), Wales (3), Ireland (4), Canada (5)and Italy 
(6).  
 
In 2009 version 2 of SAPM was adapted to Scotland to appraise the impact of MUP (2) and this 
model was updated with new data in 2010 (7) and 2012 (8). Since this time the methodology which 
underpins SAPM has been developed and refined significantly, most notably to account for variation 
in impact between different sociodemographic groups (9,10) and the ability to model a range of 
taxation policies (11). In order to avoid confusion with previous versions of the model, the current 
version is referred to as SAPM3 throughout this report. 
 
In 2015 SARG were commissioned by the Scottish Government to adapt SAPM3 (the ‘Sheffield 
Model’) to Scotland in order to appraise the potential impact of MUP and increases in alcohol 
taxation on levels of alcohol consumption in Scotland in different population subgroups defined by 
income and level of drinking. The current report represents the results of this work. 
 
2.2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS ADDRESSED 
The policies analysed in this report are Minimum Unit Price (MUP) policies with thresholds of 30p, 
40p, 50p, 60p, 70p per unit of alcohol and taxation interventions based on the duty and VAT rates 
effective from 23 March 2015 (the rates applicable at the time this work was commissioned). The 
baseline year in the model is 2014, the latest year for which baseline alcohol consumption and 
health outcomes data is available. It is therefore assumed that all appraised policies are 
implemented in 2014 and all baseline data and costs are adjusted to 2014 prices accordingly. The 
main research questions are concerned with the likely effects of introducing an MUP on alcohol 
consumption, spending, Exchequer and retailer receipts and health in Scotland and comparison of 
the relative impact of a 50p MUP and taxation policies on consumption, spending and health across 
the population. Specifically these analyses seek to examine the degree to which MUP and taxation 
policies are targeted measures for the reduction of alcohol-related harm. 
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The specific policy options appraised are: 
• MUP of 30p, 40p, 50p, 60p, 70p 
• Taxation interventions based on the duty and VAT rates effective from 23 March 2015. 
o Required percentage increase in alcohol taxation rates across all beverages that 
will achieve the same level of: 
 
1. Reduction in annual deaths due to alcohol 
2. Reduction in annual deaths due to alcohol among hazardous and harmful 
drinkers 
3. Reduction in annual deaths due to alcohol among harmful drinkers 
4. Reduction in annual deaths due to alcohol among hazardous and harmful 
drinkers in poverty 
5. Reduction in annual deaths due to alcohol among harmful drinkers in 
poverty 
 
as a 50p MUP policy is estimated to achieve at full effect 1.  
                                                          
1
Full effect refers to the impact of the policy on health in the 20
th
 year following policy implementation. See 
Section 3.4.3 for details. 
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3 METHODS 
 
3.1 OVERVIEW OF SAPM3 
The aim of SAPM3 is to appraise pricing policy options via cost-benefit analyses. We have broken 
down the aims into a linked series of policy impacts to be modelled: 
 
 The effect of the policy on the distribution of prices for different types of alcohol; 
 The effect of changes in price distributions on patterns of both on-trade and off-trade 
alcohol consumption; 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on revenue for retailers and the 
exchequer; 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on consumer spending on alcohol; 
 The effect of changes in alcohol consumption patterns on levels of alcohol-related health 
harms. 
 
To estimate these effects, two connected models have been built: 
1. A model of the relationship between alcohol prices and alcohol consumption which accounts 
for the relationship between average weekly alcohol consumption, the patterns in which 
that alcohol is drunk and how these are distributed within the population, considering 
gender, age, income and consumption level. 
2. A model of the relationship between i) both average level and patterns of alcohol 
consumption and ii) alcohol-related mortality and morbidity and the costs associated with 
these harms. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates this conceptual framework. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: High-level conceptual framework of SAPM3 
 
Policy 
Price 
Consumption 
Risk 
Harm 
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3.2 MODELLING THE LINK BETWEEN INTERVENTION AND CONSUMPTION 
 
3.2.1 Overview 
The pricing model uses a simulation framework based on classical econometrics. The fundamental 
concept is that (i) a current consumption dataset is held for the population; (ii) a policy gives rise to a 
change in price; (iii) a change in consumption is estimated from the price change using the price 
elasticity of demand; (iv) the consumption change is used to update the current consumption 
dataset. 
 
As no single dataset exists in Scotland which contains the necessary data on both prices paid and 
consumption of alcohol, the link between price and consumption is modelled using different 
datasets. This section provides an overview of the data sources on alcohol consumption and pricing 
which were used, before detailing the procedures for modelling the effect that price-based policy 
interventions have on consumption. 
 
3.2.2 Consumption data 
The Scottish Health Survey (SHeS) is an annual survey of around 6,500 individuals, including over 
4,500 adults aged 16+, living in Scotland. It records a range of demographic data on respondents, 
including age, gender, income and mean weekly consumption of alcohol. Alcohol consumption is 
measured using a series of beverage specific ‘quantity-frequency’ questions in which respondents 
are asked how frequently they drink a particular beverage type (e.g. strong beer) and how much of 
that beverage they drink on a typical occasion. These questions are converted to a mean weekly 
alcohol consumption for each respondent using assumptions of the alcohol by volume (ABV) of each 
beverage. For the present analysis ABV estimates from market research specialists Nielsen were 
provided by NHS Health Scotland. These are used in regular publications tracking trends in alcohol 
sales in Scotland (e.g. (12,13)) and represent the most up to date estimates available. The use of 
current ABV data is important as there have been notable changes in the strength of alcoholic 
products over time, both due to people switching to stronger or weaker products within the same 
beverage category and also due to changes in the ABVs of the products themselves (such as long-
term increases in the average strength of wine (14)). These ABV figures are commercially sensitive 
and cannot therefore be reproduced here. Figure 3.2 presents the resulting distribution of mean 
weekly consumption from the SHeS data. 
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Figure 3.2: Distribution of mean weekly alcohol consumption (SHeS 2014) 
 
This population is divided into abstainers and three drinker groups: 
 Moderate drinkers – those whose usual alcohol intake is no more than 21/14 units per week 
for men/women (1 unit = 8g of ethanol)2 
 Hazardous drinkers – those drinkers consuming 21-50 units per week for men or 14-35 units 
per week for women 
 Harmful drinkers – drinkers whose usual alcohol intake exceeds 50/35 units per week for 
men/women. 
 
Overall, 14.9% of the adult population (16+) in Scotland are abstainers, 60.5% are moderate 
drinkers, 19.1% are hazardous drinkers and 5.4% are harmful drinkers. On average moderate 
drinkers consume 312 units per year, hazardous drinkers consume 1,402 units and high risk drinkers 
consume 3,498 units. Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 illustrate how consumption patterns differ for the 
population between those in poverty and not in poverty3. From Figure 3.3 we can see that 
individuals in poverty are more likely to be abstainers (25% vs. 13%) and also marginally less likely to 
drink at high risk levels (5.1% vs. 5.5%). Figure 3.4 shows that moderate drinkers in poverty drink 
less, on average, than those not in poverty, consuming 238 units per year compared to 323. In 
contrast, hazardous and harmful drinkers in poverty drink more on average (1,456 and 4,499 units 
per year respectively) than their counterparts who aren’t in poverty (1,396 and 3,348 units per year 
respectively). 
                                                          
2
 Note that this work was commissioned before the UK Chief Medical Officers announced new drinking 
guidelines which recommend that both men and women should not drink more than 14 units of alcohol per 
week. This change would not substantively affect the results presented in this report, although it would alter 
the distribution of effects between moderate and hazardous drinkers. 
3
 Poverty is defined as an individual having an equivalised household income below 60% of the population 
median. 
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Figure 3.3: Drinker group distribution by income (SHeS 2014) 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Mean consumption by drinker group by income (SHeS 2014) 
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3.2.4 Patterns of consumption 
In addition to mean weekly consumption of alcohol, a significant number of the harms modelled in 
SAPM3 are a function of intoxication; that is to say that they are related to the patterns in which 
alcohol is drunk, not just the overall volume consumed. In common with previous versions of SAPM 
we have used peak day consumption in the previous week in the SHeS as a proxy measure for 
consumption patterns and relate the measure with wholly attributable acute health conditions. Peak 
day volume is calculated using similar beverage-specific quantity questions to mean consumption, 
and responses are converted to units of alcohol using the same ABV assumptions. Figure 3.5 
presents the distribution of peak day consumption from the SHeS data. 
 
In addition to peak day consumption in the previous week, a new method has been developed to 
model individual drinking patterns and their relationship to partially attributable injuries (see Section 
3.3.5.3 for an explanation of this method). 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Distribution of peak day consumption (SHeS 2014) 
 
3.2.5 Prices 
Data on the prices paid for alcohol beverages is taken from the Living Costs and Food Survey (LCF), 
formerly the Expenditure and Food Survey (EFS). Via a special data request to the Department for 
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) anonymised individual-level diary data on 25 
categories of alcohol (e.g. off-trade beers, see Table 3.1 for a full list) detailing both expenditure (in 
pence) and quantity (in natural volume of product) were made available to the authors. Volumes of 
product were converted to volumes of ethanol (in units) using the same ABV assumptions as those 
used in processing the SHeS data. All transactions from Scotland for the period from 2001-2013 were 
pooled (adjusting prices for inflation using alcohol-specific Retail Price Indices (RPIs) (15)) to give a 
total sample size of 27,611 purchasing transactions. These transactions were used to construct the 
baseline empirical price distributions for each modelled subgroup and each of 10 modelled beverage 
types including beer, cider, wine, spirits and ready-to-drink (RTD) split by off-trade and on-trade. 
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Table 3.1: Matching of LCF/EFS product categories to modelled categories and ABV estimates 
LCF/EFS 
on /off 
trade 
LCF/EFS category Modelled 
category 
Off-trade Beers off-trade beer 
Off-trade Lagers and continental beers off-trade beer 
Off-trade Ciders and Perry off-trade cider 
Off-trade Champagne, sparkling wines and wine with mixer off-trade wine 
Off-trade Table wine off-trade wine 
Off-trade Spirits with mixer off-trade spirits 
Off-trade Fortified wines off-trade wine 
Off-trade Spirits off-trade spirits 
Off-trade Liqueurs and cocktails off-trade spirits 
Off-trade Alcopops off-trade RTDs 
On-trade Spirits on-trade spirits 
On-trade Liqueurs on-trade spirits 
On-trade Cocktails on-trade spirits 
On-trade Spirits or liqueurs with mixer on-trade spirits 
On-trade Wine (not sparkling) including unspecified 'wine' on-trade wine 
On-trade Sparkling wines and wine with mixer (e.g. Bucks Fizz) on-trade wine 
On-trade Fortified wine on-trade wine 
On-trade Cider or Perry - half pint or bottle on-trade cider 
On-trade Cider or Perry - pint or can or size not specified on-trade cider 
On-trade Alcoholic soft drinks (alcopops) and ready-mixed bottled drinks on-trade RTDs 
On-trade Bitter - half pint or bottle on-trade beer 
On-trade Bitter - pint or can or size not specified on-trade beer 
On-trade Lager or other beers including unspecified 'beer' - half pint or bottle on-trade beer 
On-trade Lager or other beers including unspecified 'beer' – pint, can or size unspecified on-trade beer 
On-trade Round of drinks, alcohol not otherwise specified on-trade beer 
 
 
Off-trade sales data for Scotland for 2014 from The Nielsen Company (Nielsen) has been published 
by NHS Health Scotland (13). This data gives the volume of alcohol sold at a range of price bands by 
beverage type for the off-trade. This was used to adjust the raw price distributions for each 
beverage in the off-trade taken from the LCF/EFS survey for Scotland. This approach is perceived to 
give a more accurate measure of price since self-reported survey data can underestimate total 
expenditure. Similar data for on-trade sales was obtained for 2011 for England from CGA Strategy. 
This, together with high-level on-trade sales data for Scotland from 2014 from Nielsen (13), was used 
to adjust the raw on-trade price distributions. A full description of the adjustment methodology can 
be found in Section 2.1 of Meng et al. 2012 (8). The unadjusted raw LCF/EFS price distributions and 
the adjusted price distributions are illustrated in the Appendix in Figure 7.1 for the off-trade and 
Figure 7.2 for the on-trade, split by beer, cider, wine and spirits (RTDs are not presented, however 
they make up less than 1.5% of the market). These illustrate that, following adjustment, less cheap 
alcohol was estimated to be sold compared with before adjustment. For example, the raw data 
shows that 71%, 87%, 44% and 69% of off-trade beer, cider, wine and spirits respectively were sold 
below 50p/unit in 2014, compared to 64%, 74%, 30% and 63% respectively using the adjusted price 
distributions. The final (adjusted) price distributions for all beverage types are shown in Figure 3.6.  
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Figure 3.6: Final on- and off-trade price distributions used in SAPM3 
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3.2.6 Price elasticities of alcohol demand 
The Sheffield Alcohol Research Group have recently utilised LCF/EFS data from 2001-2009 for the 
whole of Great Britain (N=227,933 transactions) to provide new estimates of the own- and cross-
price elasticities of demand for 10 types of alcohol beverages including beer, cider, spirits and RTDs 
separated by off- and on-trade. Price elasticities of alcohol demand represent the percentage change 
in alcohol demand due to a 1% change in alcohol price. Own-price elasticities indicate the 
percentage change in the demand for a type of alcohol due to a 1% change in the price of that same 
type of alcohol. Cross-price elasticities indicate the percentage change in demand for a type of 
alcohol due to a 1% change in the price of another type of alcohol. The sign of cross-price elasticities 
indicates whether the two types of alcohol of interest are substitutes (i.e. positive sign) or 
complements (i.e. negative sign). Full details of the elasticities model have been described elsewhere 
(16). The subset of the LCF/EFS dataset for Scotland is too small to allow this methodology to be 
applied to estimate Scotland-specific elasticities and therefore elasticities for the whole of Great 
Britain (which are estimated, in part, on Scottish data) are utilised in SAPM3. 
 
Table 3.2 summarises the key results of this econometric analysis as a 10x10 elasticity matrix, with 
values on the diagonal representing own-price elasticities and remaining values representing cross-
price elasticities. Elasticities are available for 10 modelled beverage categories. For example, the 
estimated own-price elasticity for off-trade beer is -0.98, indicating the demand for off-trade beer is 
estimated to reduce by 9.8% when the price of off-trade beer is increased by 10%, all other things 
being equal. The estimated cross-price elasticity of demand for on-trade wine with regard to off-
trade beer price is 0.25, indicating the demand for on-trade wine increases by 2.5% when the price 
for off-trade beer is increased by 10% (i.e. a substitution effect). 
21 
 
Table 3.2: Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities for off- and on-trade beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs in Great Britain 
  
Purchase 
Off-beer Off-cider Off-wine Off-spirits Off-RTDs On-beer On-cider On-wine On-spirits On-RTDs 
Price 
Off-beer -0.980* -0.189 0.096 -0.368 -1.092 -0.016 -0.050 0.253 0.030 0.503 
Off-cider 0.065 -1.268* 0.118 -0.122 -0.239 -0.053 0.093 0.067 -0.108 -0.194 
Off-wine -0.040 0.736* -0.384* 0.363 0.039 -0.245 -0.155 0.043 -0.186 0.110 
Off-spirits 0.113 -0.024 0.163 -0.082 -0.042 0.167 0.406 0.005 0.084 0.233 
Off-RTDs -0.047 -0.159 -0.006 0.079 -0.585* -0.061 0.067 0.068 -0.179* 0.093 
On-beer 0.148 -0.285 0.115 -0.028 0.803 -0.786* 0.867 1.042* 1.169* -0.117 
On-cider -0.100 0.071 0.043 0.021 0.365 0.035 -0.591* 0.072 0.237* 0.241 
On-wine -0.197 0.094 -0.154 -0.031 -0.093 -0.276 -0.031 -0.871* -0.021 -0.363 
On-spirits 0.019 -0.117 -0.027 -0.280 -0.145 -0.002 -0.284 0.109 -0.890* 0.809* 
On-RTDs 0.079 0.005 -0.085 -0.047 0.369 0.121 -0.394 -0.027 -0.071 -0.187 
Remarks *: p-value <0.05 
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3.2.7 Modelling the impact of interventions on price 
In order to estimate the impact of taxation and pricing-based interventions on alcohol consumption 
it is first necessary to estimate the effect of the policy on the beverage-specific price distributions 
described in Section 3.2.5. This is done by applying appropriate assumptions to the adjusted LCF/EFS 
transaction data as follows: 
 
3.2.7.1 Impact of a minimum unit price on the price distribution 
For each price observation that is below the defined minimum price threshold, the price is inflated 
to the level of the threshold. 
 
3.2.7.2 Impact of increasing duty rates on the price distribution 
The duty rates used in SAPM3 are based on the current duty rates at the time this work was 
commissioned, set by Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) (i.e. those effective from March 
2015 (17)). In order to implement these rates within the model, a number of assumptions must be 
made as: 1) different duty rates are currently used within some modelled beverage types (e.g. there 
are three duty rates for beer, which increase with alcohol content) and 2) duty rates for cider and 
wine are calculated based on product volume rather than ethanol content. When multiple duty rates 
exist (for beer, cider and wine), we calculate the mean duty rate paid per unit using Nielsen and CGA 
sales data to derive estimated sales volumes within each duty rate band. ABV assumptions for cider 
and wine are based on the average ABV used by HMRC (personal communication with HMRC in 
March 2013). Table 3.3 illustrates the range of duty rates and bands within each beverage type and 
the duty rates per unit used in SAPM3. 
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Table 3.3: Actual and modelled duty rates by beverage type 
Beverage type 
Alcoholic 
strength (ABV) 
Applicable duty rate (effective 
March 2015) 
Estimated 
average duty rate 
(pence per unit) 
Beer 
1.2%-2.8% £8.10 per litre of ethanol 
18.49 2.8%-7.5% £18.37 per litre of ethanol 
7.5%+ £23.85 per litre of ethanol 
Cider (incl. perry) 
Still 
1.2%-7.5% £38.87 per 100 litres of product 
7.97 
7.5%-8.5% £58.75 per 100 litres of product 
Sparkling 
1.2%-5.5% £38.87 per 100 litres of product 
5.5%-8.5% £264.61 per 100 litres of product 
Wine 
Still 
1.2%-4% £84.21 per 100 litres of product 
22.43 
4%-5.5% £115.80 per 100 litres of product 
5.5%-15% £273.31 per 100 litres of product 
15%-22% £364.37 per 100 litres of product 
22%+ £27.66 per litre of ethanol 
Sparkling 
5.5%-8.5% £264.61 per 100 litres of product 
8.5-15% £350.07 per 100 litres of product 
Spirits & spirits based RTDs All £27.66 per litre of ethanol 27.66 
 
Given an increase in duty rate of 𝑥% is applied to all beverage types, in order to operationalise the 
effect on price the main ingredient required is the increase in duty per unit relative to the current 
system. Mathematically, for a given beverage type 𝑖, this can be expressed as follows: 
 
                                              𝛿𝑖
∗ = 𝑥 ×  𝛿𝑖  × (1 + 𝑉𝐴𝑇 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒),                                      Equation 1 
 
where the current VAT is 20% and the parameters  𝛿𝑖
∗and  𝛿𝑖  denote duty plus VAT per unit increase 
and current duty per unit respectively. 
 
The rate to which increases in alcohol duty and VAT are passed through to consumers in 
supermarkets has been shown to vary by beverage type and baseline price (18). That is, the 
proportion of a duty increase that is passed on to consumers varies depending on different price 
points of the baseline price distribution. Importantly when considering the impact of taxation as a 
mechanism to increase the prices of the cheapest alcohol, this evidence shows that cheaper 
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products are under-shifted (i.e. pass-through is less than duty increase) while products sold above 
the median unit price are over-shifted (i.e. pass-through is more than duty increase). This gradient is 
observed across all beverage types. It is also notable that beer and spirits see lower rates of pass-
through across the entire price distribution than wine. Figure 3.7 shows the pass-through rates by 
beverage type across the price distribution identified by Ally et al. 2014 (from Table S1). 
 
 
Figure 3.7: Off-trade tax pass-through rates taken from Ally et al. 2014 
 
This evidence is incorporated in SAPM3 by first sifting through off-trade transaction level prices of 
each beverage type (𝑖) and determining the price per unit band, on the price distribution, at which 
the beverage price falls in. Thereafter, a post duty increase per unit price (𝑝𝑖
∗) is calculated by 
summing the baseline per unit price (𝑝𝑖) of beverage 𝑖 and the product of duty plus VAT per unit 
increase (𝛿𝑖
∗) and corresponding pass-through rate: 
 
𝑝𝑖
∗ =  𝑝𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖
∗  × (𝑝𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑡ℎ𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑔ℎ 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒).                            Equation 2 
 
For instance, if the baseline price of beer sold in the off-trade is in the lowest decile of prices per unit 
then a pass-through rate of 0.852 would be applied to any duty increase.  
 
No equivalent evidence could be identified on pass-through rates in the on-trade. Given the 
significant differences in prices paid, products sold and business models we do not believe it is 
reasonable to assume that off-trade pass-through rates can be applied equally to the on-trade. For 
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all on-trade products it is therefore assumed that the pass-through rate is 1. That is, duty increases 
are fully passed on to consumers. 
 
3.2.8 Modelling the impact of price on consumption 
After adjusting the price distributions, the final step to estimating the impact of the intervention on 
alcohol consumption is to apply the price elasticities. For each modelled subgroup the impact of the 
change in prices caused by the policy on mean weekly alcohol consumption is estimated using the 
elasticity matrix described in Table 3.2. The formula used to apply the elasticity matrix is shown 
below: 
 
%∆𝐶𝑖 = (1 + 𝑒𝑖𝑖%∆𝑝𝑖)(1 + ∑ 𝑒𝑖𝑗%∆𝑝𝑗) − 1
∀𝑗
𝑗≠𝑖        Equation 3    
 
Where, %∆Ci is the estimated percentage change in consumption for beverage i, eii is the own-price 
elasticity for beverage i, %∆pi is the percentage change in price for beverage i, eij is the cross-price 
elasticities for the consumption of beverage i due to a change in the price of beverage j, and %∆pj is 
the percentage change in price for beverage j. 
 
 
3.3 MODELLING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CONSUMPTION AND HARM 
 
3.3.1 Model structure 
An epidemiological approach is used to model the relationship between consumption and harm, 
relating changes in the prevalence of alcohol consumption to changes in prevalence of risk of 
experiencing harmful outcomes. Risk functions relating consumption (however described) to level of 
risk (both of mortality and morbidity) are a fundamental component of this ‘consumption to harm’ 
model. 
 
3.3.2 A note on terminology 
There is much confusion around the terminology used to refer to alcohol and its relationship with 
health. Terms such as alcohol-specific, alcohol-related and alcohol-attributable can all be used in 
different contexts to refer to different outcomes – see Section 7 of this report from the Office for 
National Statistics for a discussion of some of these issues (19). Throughout this report we use the 
following terms and definitions: 
Alcohol-specific condition: Any condition which is wholly-attributable to alcohol, i.e. alcohol is the 
sole cause. Equivalently, any conditions for which the Alcohol Attributable Fraction (see Section 
3.3.4) is 1. 
Alcohol-related condition: Any health condition which is at least partially attributable to alcohol. See 
Table 3.4 for a full list, noting that this is different from the definition used by the ONS. 
Alcohol-related mortality: All deaths from conditions which are alcohol-related which are directly 
attributable to alcohol (i.e. would not have happened if the individual did not drink).  
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3.3.3 Alcohol-related health conditions 
The model aims to capture the policy impact for the large number of health conditions for which 
there is evidence that alcohol plays a contributory role. Table 3.4 presents a list of all conditions 
included in the model, which has been adapted from recent global meta-analyses and burden of 
disease studies (20,21). These conditions are divided into four categories of attribution: 
 
1) Wholly attributable chronic – meaning that the harm cannot occur in the absence of alcohol 
consumption, and risk of occurrence changes with chronic (i.e. long-term) exposure to alcohol 
(e.g. alcoholic liver disease, ICD10 code = K70). 
2) Wholly attributable acute – meaning that the harm cannot occur without alcohol consumption, 
and risk of occurrence changes with acute (i.e. short-term) exposure to alcohol including 
intoxication (e.g. Ethanol poisoning, ICD10 code = T51.0). 
3) Partially attributable diseases – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the risk of 
occurrence changes with chronic exposure to alcohol (e.g. malignant neoplasm (cancer) of the 
oesophagus, ICD10 code = C15). There are three conditions within this category – ischaemic 
heart disease, ischaemic stroke, and type II diabetes – in which alcohol, at low levels, may have 
an overall protective effect. A fourth condition, hypertension, has an estimated overall 
protective effect for women only and at low levels of consumption (<14g/day). 
4) Partially attributable injuries – meaning that the harm can occur without alcohol but the risk of 
occurrence changes with acute exposure to alcohol (e.g. falls, ICD10 code = W00-W19, or 
assault, ICD10 = X85-Y09). 
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Table 3.4: Health conditions included in the model 
Main 
category 
Sub 
category 
Disease or injury ICD-10 codes Source of risk 
functions 
Wholly 
attributable 
to alcohol 
(17) 
Chronic (10) Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome E24.4 By definition AAF=1 
and no defined relative 
risk functions. See 
Section 3.3.5.1 for 
details. 
Degeneration G31.2 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy G62.1 
Alcoholic myopathy G72.1 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy I42.6 
Alcoholic gastritis K29.2 
Alcoholic liver disease K70.0-K70.4, K70.9 
Acute pancreatitis (alcohol induced) K85.2 
Chronic pancreatitis (alcohol induced) K86.0 
Maternal care for (suspected) damage to foetus from 
alcohol 
O35.4 
Acute (7) Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of 
alcohol 
F10 
Excessive Blood Level of Alcohol R78.0 
Toxic effect of alcohol T51.0, T51.1, T51.8, 
T51.9 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to alcohol X45 
Intentional self-poisoning by and exposure to alcohol X65 
Poisoning by and exposure to alcohol, undetermined 
intent 
Y15 
Evidence of alcohol involvement determined by 
blood alcohol level 
Y90 
Partially 
attributable 
to alcohol 
(23) 
Diseases 
(overall 
detrimental) 
(14) 
Tuberculosis A15-A19, B90 Lonnroth et al 2008 
(22) 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and pharynx C00-C14 Tramacere et al 2010 
(23) 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus C15 Rota et al 2009 (24) 
Malignant neoplasm of colon and rectum C18-C21 Fedirko et al 2011 (25) 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic bile 
ducts 
C22 Corrao et al 2004 (26) 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx C32 Islami et al 2010 (27) 
Malignant neoplasm of breast C50 Key et al 2006 (28) 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus G40-G41 Samokhvalov et al 
2010 (29) 
Hypertensive diseases I10-I14 Taylor et al 2009 (30) 
Cardiac arrhythmias I47-I48 Kodama et al 2011 (31) 
haemorrhagic and other non-ischaemic stroke I60-I62, I69.0-I69.2 Patra et al 2010 (32) 
Lower respiratory infections: pneumonia J09-J22, J85, P23 Samokhvalov et al 
2010 (33) 
Cirrhosis of the liver (excluding alcoholic liver 
disease) 
K70 (excl. K70.0-K70.4, 
K70.9), K73-K74 
Rehm et al 2010 (34) 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis K85-K86 excl. K85.2, 
K86.0 
Irving et al 2009 (35) 
Injuries (9) Transport injuries (including road traffic accidents) V01-V98, Y85.0 Based on Taylor et al 
2011 (36). See Section 
3.3.5.3 for more 
details. 
Fall injuries W00-W19 
Exposure to mechanical forces (including machinery 
accidents) 
W20-W52 
Drowning W65-W74 
Other Unintentional Injuries W75-W99, X30-X33, 
X50-X58 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to noxious 
substances 
X40-X49 excl. X45 
Intentional self-harm X60-X84, Y87.0 excl. 
X65 
Assault X85-Y09, Y87.1 
Other intentional injuries Y35 
Diseases (overall 
protective) (3) 
Diabetes mellitus (type II) E10-E14 Baliunas et al 2009 (37) 
Ischaemic heart disease I20-I25 Roerecke and Rehm 
2012 (38) 
Ischaemic stroke I63-I67, I69.3 Patra et al 2010 (32) 
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3.3.4 Alcohol-attributable fractions and potential impact fractions 
The methodology is similar to that used in Gunning-Scheper’s Prevent model (39), being based on 
the notion of the alcohol-attributable fraction (AAF) and its more general form, the potential impact 
fraction (PIF). 
 
The AAF of a disease can be defined as the difference between the overall average risk (or incidence 
rate) of the disease in the entire population (drinkers and never-drinkers) and the average risk in 
those without the exposure factor under investigation (never-drinkers), expressed as a fraction of 
the overall average risk. For example, the AAF for female breast cancer is simply the risk of breast 
cancer in the total female population minus the risk of breast cancer in women who have never 
consumed alcohol, divided by the breast cancer risk for the total female population. Thus, AAFs are 
used as a measure of the proportion of the disease that is attributable to alcohol. While this 
approach has traditionally been used for chronic health-related outcomes, it can in principle be 
applied to other harms (including those outside of the health domain). 
 
The AAF can be calculated using the following formula: 
                                         Equation 4 
 
where, RRi is the relative risk (RR) due to exposure to alcohol at consumption state i, pi is the 
proportion of the population exposed to alcohol at consumption state i, and n is the number of 
consumption states. 
 
If the reference category is abstention from alcohol then the AAF describes the proportion of 
outcomes that would not have occurred if everyone in the population had abstained from drinking. 
Thus the numerator is essentially the excess expected cases due to alcohol exposure and the 
denominator is the total expected cases. In situations where certain levels of alcohol consumption 
reduce the risk of an outcome (e.g. coronary heart disease) the AAF can be negative and would 
describe the additional cases that would have occurred if everyone was an abstainer. 
 
Note that there are methodological difficulties with AAF studies. One problem is in defining the non-
exposed group – in one sense ‘never drinkers’ are the only correct non-exposed group, but they are 
rare and usually quite different from the general population in various respects. However, current 
non-drinkers include those who were heavy drinkers in the past (and these remain a high-risk group, 
especially if they have given up due to alcohol-related health problems). Several studies show that 
findings of avoided coronary heart disease risk may be based on systematic errors in the way 
abstainers were defined in the underlying studies (40,41) and that there may be no overall 
protective effects on all-cause mortality from moderate alcohol consumption (42,43).  
 
The PIF is a generalisation of the AAF based on changes to the prevalence of alcohol consumption 
(rather than assuming all drinkers become abstainers). Note that a lag may exist between the 
exposure to alcohol and the resulting change in risk. The PIF can be calculated using the following 
formula: 
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                                                        Equation 5 
 
where 𝑝𝑖  is the modified prevalence for consumption state i and state 0 corresponds to abstention. 
In the model, alcohol consumption in a population subgroup is described non-parametrically by the 
associated observations from the SHeS. For any harmful outcome, risk levels are associated with 
consumption level for each of the observations (note that these are not person-level risk functions). 
The associated prevalence for the observation is simply defined by its sample weight from the 
survey. Therefore, the PIF is implemented in the model as: 
 
                         Equation 6  
 
where wi is the weight for observation i, 𝑅𝑅𝑖 is the modified risk for the new consumption level and 
N is the number of samples. 
 
3.3.5 Applying potential impact fractions 
The impact of a change in consumption on health harms was examined using the potential impact 
fraction framework and by three different methods for implementation: 
 
1. Direct application of consumption measures to calculate potential impact fractions for 
wholly attributable chronic and acute conditions.  
2. Relative risk functions from the published literature for partial attributable chronic 
diseases. 
3. Relative risk functions from the published literature and derived individual annualised 
risk for partial attributable injuries. 
 
 
3.3.5.1 Wholly attributable chronic and acute conditions 
Wholly attributable chronic and acute conditions, by definition, have an AAF=1 and no relative risk 
function can be defined since the reference group has no risk. In order to apply the potential impact 
fraction, relative risk in Equation 6 is replaced with alcohol consumption that is likely to lead to 
increased risk for the health condition, denoted by RiskAlci. For wholly attributable chronic 
conditions, RiskAlci is defined as the difference between mean daily consumption and recommended 
daily consumption in the UK (3/2 units for men/women4) or 0 if mean daily consumption is below 
the threshold. For wholly attributable acute conditions, RiskAlci is defined as the difference between 
peak day consumption and the cut-off thresholds of 4/3 units for men/women at which we assume 
the acute risk starts to increase or 0 if peak day consumption is below the threshold.  
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3.3.5.2 Partially attributable chronic conditions 
The relative risk functions for all chronic conditions that are partially attributable to alcohol are 
taken from published meta-analyses and used in Equation 6. Table 3.4 gives the sources for these 
risk functions. For Ischaemic Heart Disease we also incorporate more recent evidence which 
suggests that heavy episodic, or ‘binge’ drinking, may attenuate or remove entirely any protective 
effects (44). This is operationalised by removing any protective effects for individuals in the SHeS 
who drink at a level such that they must meet the definition of heavy episodic drinking used in the 
study (>60g ethanol per day). This is in line with the approach taken in other international studies 
(45) and is likely to be conservative as we do not remove the protective effects for SHeS individuals 
who may be drinking above the 60g threshold infrequently (and thus have a mean daily 
consumption of less than 60g). 
 
3.3.5.3 Partially attributable acute conditions 
Partially attributable acute conditions include various traffic and non-traffic injuries. The identified 
relative risk functions for these conditions are different from the relative risk functions for partially 
attributable chronic conditions and cannot be used directly in Equation 6. The input and outcome of 
the relative risk functions for partially attributable chronic conditions are usual alcohol consumption 
and relative risk over a certain period of time, however, the input and outcome of the identified 
relative risk functions for traffic and non-traffic injuries are levels of drinking on the occasion prior to 
the injury and the relative risk for the drinking occasion (36). As SAPM3 works on annual cycles, 
relative risk in Equation 6 is implicitly defined as annual relative risk. Therefore, to apply Equation 6, 
single drinking occasion based relative risk needs to be converted to long-term (e.g. annual) relative 
risk of an individual in the survey.  
 
A new method to estimate annualised relative risk of alcohol-attributable traffic- and non-traffic 
injuries has been developed. Briefly, three measures are defined to represent drinking pattern based 
on single drinking occasions which are the frequency of drinking occasions (defined as n, or number 
of drinking occasions per week), mean level of alcohol consumption for a given drinking occasion 
(defined as 𝜇, or units of alcohol) and the variability of alcohol consumption for a given drinking 
occasion (defined as 𝜎, or standard deviation of units of alcohol consumed in drinking occasions). 
Using the ONS’ National Diet and Nutrition Survey (NDNS), regression models were fitted to relate 
the three measures with mean consumption and a range of independent variables (e.g. age, gender, 
education, ethnicity, etc.) (46). These regression models are used to impute the three measures for 
each individual in the Scottish Health Survey. For each individual, alcohol consumption on a given 
drinking occasion is assumed to follow a normal distribution with mean of 𝜇 and standard deviation 
of 𝜎; and the duration of intoxication for a given drinking occasion is calculated by applying the 
equation for estimating blood alcohol content. Finally, a series of integrations was performed to 
calculate the annualised relative risk for traffic and non-traffic accidents. Detailed description of the 
method can be found elsewhere (47). The annualised relative risk is used in Equation 6 to estimate 
the potential impact factor for partially attributable acute conditions. 
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3.4 CONSUMPTION TO HEALTH HARMS MODEL 
 
3.4.1 Mortality model structure 
A simplified version of the model structure for mortality is presented in Figure 3.8. The model is 
developed to represent the population of Scotland in a life table. Separate life tables have been 
implemented for males and females. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.8: Simplified structure of the mortality model 
 
The life table is implemented as a linked set of simple Markov5 models with individuals of age a 
transitioning between two states – alive and dead – at model time step t. Those of age a still alive 
after the transition then form the initial population for age a+1 at time t+1 and the sequence 
repeats. 
 
The transition probabilities from the alive to dead state are broken down by condition and are 
individually modified via potential impact fractions over time t, where the PIF essentially varies with 
consumption over time: 
𝑃𝐼𝐹𝑡 = 1 −
∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑁
𝑖=1 𝑤𝑖
∑ 𝑅𝑅𝑖,0𝑤𝑖
𝑁
𝑖=1
     Equation 7 
 
where PIFt is the potential impact fraction relating to consumption at time t, i = SHeS sample 
number, N = number of samples in subgroup i, RRi,t is the risk relating to the consumption of SHeS 
sample i at time t, RRi,0 is the risk at baseline, and wi is the weight of sample i. 
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Note that the PIF can be decomposed to enable different population groups at baseline – for 
example, moderate, increasing risk and high risk drinkers or individuals in poverty and not in 
poverty– to be followed separately over the course of the model. 
 
The model computes mortality results for two separate scenarios (a baseline – implemented as ‘no 
change to consumption’ in the analysis herein – and an intervention). The effect of the intervention 
(i.e. the change in alcohol prices) is then calculated as the difference between the life tables of two 
scenarios, enabling the change in the total expected deaths attributable to alcohol due to the policy 
to be estimated. 
 
3.4.2 Morbidity model structure 
A simplified schematic of the morbidity model is shown in Figure 3.9. The model focuses on the 
expected disease prevalence for population cohorts. Note that if an incidence-based approach were 
used instead, then much more detailed modelling of survival time, cure rates, death rates and 
possibly disease progression for each disease for each population subgroup would be required. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 3.9: Simplified structure of the morbidity model 
 
The morbidity model works by partitioning the alive population at time t, rather than using a 
transition approach between states as previously described for the mortality model. Alive individuals 
are partitioned between all 43 alcohol-related conditions (and a 44th condition representing overall 
population health, not attributable to alcohol). 
 
As in the mortality model, the PIF is calculated based on the consumption distribution at time 0 and 
t. The PIF is then used to modify the partition rate (i.e. the distribution of the 43 conditions for alive 
individuals) to produce person-specific sickness volumes.  
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3.4.3 Time lag effects for chronic harms 
When modelling the link between consumption and harm, one important input is the assumption 
surrounding the ‘time lag’ – the relationship between changes in consumption levels and changes in 
risk of harm. Data on this relationship is necessary for the modelling of future outcomes from 
chronic conditions where the development of diseases often occurs over many years.  
 
A recent systematic review by members of the Sheffield Alcohol Research Group identified the best 
available published evidence on time lags for all 27 modelled chronic health conditions (48). Figure 
7.3 in the Appendix illustrates the findings of this review for a range of chronic health conditions. 
This evidence shows that, for some health conditions, notably alcohol-related cancers, the full 
effects of changes in consumption on health can take up to 20 years to be realised. We therefore 
refer to 20 years as ‘full effect’ in our modelling and the majority of results are presented for the 20th 
year following policy implementation. See Table 2 in Holmes et al. (48) for further details of these 
relationships as implemented in the model. 
 
 
3.4.4 Mortality model parameters 
Baseline population data, used to populate the initial life tables for Scotland, was obtained from ONS 
mid-year population estimates for 2014 (49). Age and gender subgroup-specific mortality rates for 
each of the 43 modelled health conditions were provided by National Records of Scotland. As 
SAPM3 requires mortality rates to be further split by poverty/not in poverty, but data on income is 
not included in the mortality register, this data was instead partitioned into individuals living in the 
most deprived 14% of the country as defined by the Scottish Index of Multiple Deprivation (SIMD) 
(where 14% corresponds to the proportion of the population who were in poverty in 2013/4 (50)) 
and those living in the remaining 86%. It is worth noting that deprivation is not an exact match for 
poverty although the two are strongly correlated. SIMD is a measure of multiple deprivation based 
partially on income but also on employment, health, education, geographical access to services, 
community safety, physical environment and housing. The overall and poverty category-specific 
mortality rates for all modelled health conditions are shown in the Appendix Table 7.1, which shows 
generally higher death rates for those in poverty both from the 43 modelled alcohol-related health 
conditions and from other causes. 
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3.4.5 Morbidity model parameters 
 
3.4.5.1 Morbidity prevalence rates 
Morbidity data for Scotland was provided by ISD Scotland based on Scottish hospital admission data 
for 2014. For each modelled health condition the total number of admissions in the year for each 
age-gender subgroup in the model was provided, with these numbers further separated by whether 
the admittee was in poverty or not, using the same SIMD-based method as described for mortality in 
Section 3.4.4. A second analysis was also performed by ISD Scotland in order to estimate the number 
of unique patients admitted over the year within each subgroup for each condition (i.e. removing 
repeat admissions from the same individual). Both analyses used the same methodology for alcohol-
attribution and counting of repeat admissions as has been used in previous Scottish adaptations of 
SAPM (8) and elsewhere (51). SAPM3 is a prevalence-based model and this unique patient analysis is 
used to provide the estimated baseline morbidity for each health condition for each modelled age-
gender-income subgroup. However, whilst the model operates on the basis of estimating morbidity, 
hospital admissions are likely to be a more relevant outcome to most stakeholders and we therefore 
require a means of estimating admissions from prevalence. This mapping from morbidity to 
hospitalisations is performed using condition-specific ‘multipliers’, which were calculated from the 
ISD data by dividing the total admissions by the estimated number of unique patients admitted over 
the year for each condition. These multipliers, which represent the mean number of hospital 
admissions per year for a person admitted at least once with a given alcohol-related condition, are 
presented in Appendix Table 7.2 together with estimated annual morbidity overall and by poverty 
category. These figures show similar patterns to the mortality data in Table 7.1, with higher rates 
amongst those in poverty for almost all alcohol-related health conditions. 
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3.5 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Best practice for policy modelling suggests reporting a single base case estimate, supported by a 
range of sensitivity analyses in order to explore the impact of key uncertainties in the evidence base 
(52). We have focused this approach on three aspects of the model: underreporting of alcohol 
consumption in surveys, price elasticities and the protective effects of drinking on health. In order to 
explore the potential uncertainties in these areas we have undertaken three distinct sensitivity 
analyses in which we test the impact of alternative assumptions in these areas on the modelled 
impact of a 50p MUP. 
 
3.5.1 Adjusting for underreporting (SA1) 
Alcohol consumption as estimated in population surveys routinely underreports known alcohol 
consumption taken from sales or excise clearance data by around 40% (i.e. the survey consumption 
accounts for only 60% of all alcohol sold) (12,53). There may be many explanations for this 
discrepancy, both in the survey, including missing or under-represented populations, recall bias in 
respondents and a tendency to underestimate the size or alcohol content of home-poured drinks 
and in the sales or clearance data, including illicit alcohol and wastage. See Meier et al. 2013 and 
Robinson et al. 2012 for a full discussion of these issues (53,54). 
A range of methods have been proposed to account for this observed underreporting, from simple 
adjustment factors to more complex methods which retain the distributional characteristics of the 
drinking distribution. We implement here a variation on the ‘gamma-shifting’ method of Rehm et al. 
which has previously been applied to SHeS data (8,55). Full details of the method can be found in 
Meng et al. 2012 Section 2.6.2.3, but in summary: the beverage-specific distribution of alcohol 
consumption within the population is parameterised as a gamma distribution. The mean of this 
distribution is then ‘upshifted’ to match the mean consumption of that beverage per adult from 
2014 taken from Nielsen sales data (13). For every individual in the SHeS, their beverage-specific 
consumption is then adjusted by the ratio between their centile’s value in the original and the 
upshifted gamma distributions. This is repeated for all beverage categories in the SHeS. 
 
3.5.2 Alternative elasticity estimates (SA2) 
Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) have recently published estimates of the price 
elasticity of alcohol which, in common with the elasticities of Meng et al. described in Section 3.2.6, 
account for differential price-responsiveness across a range of beverage types, including the on- and 
off-trade, and accounting for the full range of compliment and substitution effects (16,56). These are 
derived using a different methodology to those of Meng et al., and, although the own-price 
estimates are broadly similar, there are a number of differences in the cross-price elasticities. We 
have therefore incorporated these elasticities into SAPM to explore the impact of using this 
alternative source. 
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3.5.3 Protective effects of alcohol on health (SA3) 
The finding that alcohol has a protective effect on health, both for specific health conditions, as 
discussed in Section 3.3.3, and on overall mortality (e.g. (57)) has been widely discussed in the 
academic literature and there is no clear consensus on whether these observed protective effects 
are genuine or an artefact of the design of the primary studies (41,58). Whilst the SAPM base case is 
to include these effects as identified in the most recent high quality systematic reviews and meta-
analyses, we have tested here the impact of removing all protective effects from the model entirely. 
That is to say that the relative risk of harm is set to 1 wherever the risk functions discussed in Section 
3.3.3 would otherwise suggest a relative risk of below 1. 
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4 RESULTS 
SAPM3 produces estimates of the impact of a wide range of policies on a wide range of outcomes. 
The synthesis of data used in the model also provides insights into the baseline (i.e. current) 
consumption and spending patterns across the population as well as the distribution of alcohol-
related harm. These findings are presented here, followed by model results in 3 main sections: 
1) Estimated impacts of a 30p, 40p, 50p, 60p and 70p MUP policy 
2) Estimation of the taxation increases required to achieve the same impact on mortality as a 
50p MUP, and the estimated differences in scale and distribution of impacts of these policies 
3) Results of the sensitivity analyses on estimates of impact of a 50p MUP 
For all policies examined we present the impact on alcohol consumption, spending, exchequer and 
retailer revenue, alcohol-related mortality and alcohol-related hospital admissions. When comparing 
a 50p MUP with equalised taxation policies we also present the differential impacts on alcohol-
related health inequalities. 
 
4.1 BASELINE DATA 
4.1.1 Alcohol consumption and spending 
Table 4.1 presents the baseline distribution of the population between drinker groups, together with 
the mean consumption and mean spending of drinkers. The variation in abstention rate by poverty 
group is shown in Table 4.2. Table 4.3 breaks the consumption and spending figures down further by 
drinker and poverty group. These tables illustrate that that abstention rates are higher amongst 
those in poverty (25% vs 13%), moderate drinkers in poverty consume and spend less than their 
counterparts who are not in poverty (240 vs. 320 units per year and £230 vs. £380 per year 
respectively). This pattern is reversed for harmful drinkers, with harmful drinkers in poverty drinking 
substantially more on average (4,500 vs. 3,350 units per year) and spending slightly more (£2,500 vs. 
£2,350) than harmful drinkers who are not in poverty. 
Table 4.1: Baseline alcohol consumption and spending patterns by drinker group 
 
Population Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 3,740,472 2,659,329 841,805 239,337 
% of total drinkers 100% 71% 23% 6% 
Baseline consumption per 
drinker per year (units) 
761 312 1,402 3,498 
Baseline spending per drinker 
per year 
£675 £359 £1,194 £2,360 
 
Table 4.2: Baseline abstention rates by poverty group 
 
Abstention rate 
Population 14.9% 
In poverty 25.3% 
Not in poverty 13.2% 
38 
 
 Table 4.3: Baseline alcohol consumption and spending patterns by drinker and poverty group 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
 
  
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Drinker population 345,308 2,314,021 83,404 758,402 31,248 208,089 
% of total drinkers 9% 62% 2% 20% 1% 6% 
Baseline consumption per 
drinker per year (units) 
238 323 1,456 1,396 4,499 3,348 
Baseline spending per drinker 
per year 
£230 £378 £1,102 £1,204 £2,484 £2,341 
 
When we consider the proportion of all alcohol consumed and of total spending on alcohol by 
drinker group, as illustrated in Figure 4.1, we see that harmful drinkers, who account for only 6% of 
all drinkers and 5% of the population, drink 29% of all the alcohol drunk and account for 22% of all 
spending on alcohol in Scotland. Hazardous and harmful drinkers combined account for a quarter of 
the population (25%), yet they drink over two thirds of the alcohol (71%) and account for over three 
fifths of the total value of alcohol sales (62%). 
 
Figure 4.1: Distribution of population, total alcohol consumption and total spending on alcohol by 
drinker group 
 
Figure 4.2 and Figure 4.3 illustrate findings from the synthesis of the SHeS consumption data and 
LCF/EFS pricing data, showing the breakdown of alcohol consumed by beverage type and sector (on- 
vs. off-trade) and how these vary by drinker and poverty group. These variations are key to 
understanding the differences in impact of MUP and taxation policies, which have significantly 
different impacts on prices across different beverage types and sectors. Figure 4.2 shows that 
overall, more alcohol is drunk as wine than any other beverage type, followed by beer and spirits. 
This changes for drinkers in poverty, who consume a markedly greater proportion of their alcohol as 
spirits and cider, and considerably less as wine than those not in poverty. Beverage preferences are 
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similar across the drinker spectrum, with harmful drinkers drinking a greater proportion of their 
alcohol as cider and somewhat less as wine, although they still drink absolutely more wine on 
average than hazardous or moderate drinkers (1,140 units/year vs. 550 and 120 respectively).  
 
Figure 4.2: Beverage preferences by poverty and drinker group 
 
Figure 4.3 shows a slight increase in preference among drinkers in poverty for drinking alcohol 
bought in the off-trade compared to those not in poverty. A steeper gradient is observed across the 
drinker spectrum, with hazardous and harmful drinkers consuming proportionately more of their 
alcohol in the off-trade than moderate drinkers. 
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Figure 4.3: On- and off-trade consumption preferences by poverty and drinker group 
 
Figure 4.4 presents the variation in mean prices paid per unit of alcohol across beverage types and 
drinker groups. This illustrates that heavier drinkers pay less across all beverage types, with 
moderate drinkers paying markedly more on average for spirits and harmful drinkers paying 
markedly less on average for cider. As can be seen clearly in Figure 3.6, prices in the off-trade are 
substantially lower than in the on-trade and the gradients in Figure 4.4 are therefore a combination 
of the fact that heavier drinkers drink a greater proportion of their alcohol in the off-trade (as seen 
in Figure 4.3) and the fact that they chose cheaper products on average within each sector.  
 
Figure 4.4: Mean prices paid by beverage type and drinker group 
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Figure 4.5 shows the overall distribution of consumption across the 10 beverage and sector 
categories, separating out purchasing below 50p per unit. This highlights several important findings: 
 Almost no alcohol sold in the on-trade will be affected by a 50p MUP 
 The greatest absolute number of units bought below 50p per unit are bought as spirits in the 
off-trade 
 Although it makes up a small proportion of overall consumption (2.7%), the vast majority of 
alcohol sold as off-trade cider is sold at below 50p per unit. 
 
Figure 4.5: Overall consumption preferences including purchasing of units below 50p per unit 
 
The final graph in this section, Figure 4.6, shows how purchasing prices vary by drinker group. For 
each group it shows mean alcohol consumption (the bars), and the proportion of each group’s 
consumption which is alcohol bought at below 50p per unit (the orange section of each bar). The 
graph also shows the mean price paid for all alcohol by that group (the blue lines). A more detailed 
version of this graph further broken down by poverty group (Figure 7.4) can be found in the 
Appendix. These graphs highlight several more key patterns in baseline alcohol consumption: 
 Mean consumption is similar for those in poverty and those not in poverty across all except 
the heaviest-drinking decile, where those in poverty drink notably more 
 The heavier the drinker, the more units they purchase below 50p 
 Drinkers in poverty purchase more units for less than 50p than those not in poverty, 
particularly amongst the heaviest drinkers 
 Heavier drinkers pay less per unit for their alcohol, with drinkers in poverty paying less than 
those not in poverty across the entire drinker distribution. 
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Figure 4.6: Mean consumption, units purchased below 50p per unit and mean prices paid by 
consumption group 
 
4.1.2 Alcohol-related harm 
Table 4.4 separates out and presents the total number of deaths and hospital admissions per year at 
baseline which are estimated to be alcohol-related, i.e. only those which are attributable to alcohol 
and would not have occurred if the entire population were abstainers. This shows that cancer is the 
single biggest cause of deaths due to alcohol, followed by alcoholic liver disease, but that the 
cardioprotective protective effects of alcohol at low levels of consumption (which are disputed – see 
Section 3.5.3) also prevent a substantial number of deaths (seen as negative numbers in the Table). 
A slightly different pattern is observed in hospital admissions, with mental and behavioural disorders 
due to alcohol being the largest single cause of alcohol-related hospital admissions, followed by 
cancers, hypertension and alcoholic liver disease. Again, there is estimated to be a significant 
number of admissions averted from cardiovascular disease due to cardioprotective effects.  
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Table 4.4: Estimated baseline alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions per year by cause 
 
Baseline alcohol-related 
deaths per year  
Baseline alcohol-related 
hospital admissions per year  
Alcoholic liver disease 546 3,758 
Mental and behavioural 
disorders due to use of 
alcohol 
257 12,344 
Other wholly-attributable 
chronic conditions 
29 702 
Wholly-attributable acute 
conditions 
59 2,083 
Cancers 836 7,933 
Hypertension 61 4,890 
Stroke -174 277 
Other cardiovascular 
conditions 
-497 -12,131 
Other partially-attributable 
chronic conditions 
83 -1,193 
Transport injuries 61 1,175 
Falls 125 5,797 
Other partially-attributable 
acute conditions 
241 4,232 
 
Table 4.5 presents the overall baseline annual mortality and admission rates per 100,000 drinkers 
broken down by drinker and poverty group; showing the steep gradients in harm, with heavier 
drinkers and those in poverty suffering more harm. Most notably, we see that death rates in harmful 
drinkers in poverty are over twice as high as in harmful drinkers not in poverty. This finding is shown 
clearly in Figure 4.7 which illustrates baseline death rates by drinker and poverty group. A further 
graph illustrating the breakdown of mortality rates by condition type and poverty group can be 
found in the Appendix, Figure 7.5.  
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Table 4.5: Baseline alcohol-related death and hospital admission rates by drinker and poverty group 
  
Baseline deaths 
per 100,000 
drinkers 
Baseline hospital 
admissions per 
100,000 drinkers 
Consumption breakdown   
All drinkers 43 798 
Moderate -7 -100 
Hazardous 95 1,839 
Harmful 424 7,120 
Income group breakdown   
All drinkers 
In poverty 91 1,689 
Not in poverty 37 674 
Moderate 
In poverty 1 103 
Not in poverty -8 -130 
Hazardous 
In poverty 206 4,563 
Not in poverty 83 1,539 
Harmful 
In poverty 781 11,555 
Not in poverty 371 6,454 
 
 
Figure 4.7: Baseline alcohol-related deaths by drinker and poverty group 
 
The four graphs which make up Figure 4.8 illustrate some of the key conclusions from Section 4.1, 
which are crucial to understanding many of the patterns seen in the model results. They show the 
findings that harmful drinkers in poverty drink markedly more than those not in poverty and spend 
marginally more. This is in contrast to moderate drinkers in poverty who drink and spend less than 
moderate drinkers not in poverty. Drinkers in poverty pay less for every unit of alcohol they buy than 
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those not in poverty, with harmful drinkers in poverty paying the least, on average, for their drink. 
Finally, alcohol-related mortality is concentrated in harmful drinkers, particularly those in poverty, 
who drink a third more on average than those not in poverty, but have alcohol-related death rate 
which is more than twice as high.  
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Figure 4.8: Baseline consumption, spending, price and mortality by drinker group 
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4.2 EVALUATION OF THE IMPACT OF A RANGE OF MUP THRESHOLDS 
4.2.1 Estimated impact of MUP on alcohol consumption 
The modelled impact of MUP policies from 30p to 70p per unit on alcohol consumption is shown in 
detail in Table 4.6, which presents estimates of absolute and relative changes in consumption at the 
population level and broken down by drinker group. Table 4.7 breaks these results down further to 
illustrate the differential impact by drinker and poverty group. Figure 4.9 and Figure 4.10 illustrate 
the absolute and relative changes in consumption across all modelled MUP policies by drinker group, 
while Figure 4.11 shows absolute changes for a 50p MUP by drinker and income group. A similar 
graph showing the drinker and poverty group impacts of all modelled MUP policies can be found in 
the Appendix, Figure 7.6  
These results show that all modelled MUP policies have only small impacts on the consumption of 
moderate drinkers (-3.7 units per year, roughly equivalent to two pints of beer for a 50p MUP), but a 
much larger effect, both relatively and absolutely, on the consumption of harmful drinkers (-246 
units per year, roughly equivalent to 8 bottles of vodka or 25 bottles of wine). As might be expected, 
given they pay less for alcohol on average, hazardous and harmful drinkers in poverty see larger 
reductions in consumption than those not in poverty, with effects particularly targeted at harmful 
drinkers in poverty, especially at higher MUPs. For example, a 50p MUP is estimated to reduce 
consumption of harmful drinkers in poverty by 681 units per year on average compared to 181 units 
per year for harmful drinkers not in poverty. 
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Table 4.6: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on consumption by drinker group 
 
Population Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 3,740,472 2,659,329 841,805 239,337 
Baseline consumption per person per year 
(including abstainers) (units) 
648 250 1,402 3,498 
Baseline consumption per drinker per year (units) 761 312 1,402 3,498 
  
Absolute change per drinker per 
year (units) 
30p MUP -2.7 -0.4 -3.5 -24.6 
40p MUP -10.9 -1.6 -13.4 -105.4 
50p MUP -26.3 -3.7 -35.5 -246.2 
60p MUP -49.9 -8.1 -72.0 -437.4 
70p MUP -80.8 -15.0 -122.6 -665.2 
  
Relative change per drinker per year 
30p MUP -0.3% -0.1% -0.3% -0.7% 
40p MUP -1.4% -0.5% -1.0% -3.0% 
50p MUP -3.5% -1.2% -2.5% -7.0% 
60p MUP -6.6% -2.6% -5.1% -12.5% 
70p MUP -10.6% -4.8% -8.7% -19.0% 
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Table 4.7: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on consumption by drinker and poverty group 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
    
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Drinker population 345,308 2,314,021 83,404 758,402 31,248 208,089 
Baseline consumption per person per year (including abstainers) 
(units) 
164 266 1,456 3,417,182 3,417,182 1,456 
Baseline consumption per drinker per year (units) 238 323 1,456 1,396 4,499 3,348 
    
    
  
Absolute change per drinker per 
year (units) 
30p MUP -1.6 -0.2 -9.0 -2.9 -117.8 -10.6 
40p MUP -4.3 -1.2 -34.4 -11.1 -347.0 -69.1 
50p MUP -9.8 -2.7 -88.1 -29.7 -680.9 -180.9 
60p MUP -19.4 -6.4 -159.2 -62.4 -1128.6 -333.6 
70p MUP -30.6 -12.7 -243.8 -109.3 -1635.9 -519.5 
    
    
  
Relative change per drinker per 
year 
30p MUP -0.7% -0.1% -0.6% -0.2% -2.6% -0.3% 
40p MUP -1.8% -0.4% -2.4% -0.8% -7.7% -2.1% 
50p MUP -4.1% -0.8% -6.1% -2.1% -15.1% -5.4% 
60p MUP -8.1% -2.0% -10.9% -4.5% -25.1% -10.0% 
70p MUP -12.9% -3.9% -16.7% -7.8% -36.4% -15.5% 
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Figure 4.9: Absolute changes in consumption under MUP policies by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.10: Relative changes in consumption under MUP policies by drinker group 
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Figure 4.11: Absolute changes in consumption under a 50p MUP by drinker and poverty group 
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drinker group (Table 4.8) and drinker and poverty group (Table 4.9). Figure 4.12 illustrates results for 
absolute spending changes by drinker group, while Figure 4.13 shows the full breakdown by income 
and poverty group for a 50p MUP. A similar graph showing the impact of all modelled MUP policies 
can be found in the Appendix, Figure 7.7. 
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estimated to spend £20 more per year). Similar patterns can be seen for higher levels of MUP.  
-800
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
In poverty Not in poverty
A
b
so
lu
te
 c
h
an
ge
 in
 c
o
n
su
m
p
ti
o
n
 (
u
n
it
s 
p
e
r 
d
ri
n
ke
r 
p
e
r 
ye
ar
) 
Moderate
Hazardous
Harmful
52 
 
Table 4.8: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker group 
 
Population Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Drinker population 3,740,472 2,659,329 841,805 239,337 
Baseline spending per drinker per 
year 
£675 £359 £1,194 £2,360 
  
Absolute change per 
drinker per year 
30p MUP -£1 £0 -£2 -£4 
40p MUP -£2 -£1 -£2 -£17 
50p MUP £5 £2 £15 £6 
60p MUP £20 £8 £50 £55 
70p MUP £35 £15 £85 £81 
  
Relative change per 
drinker per year 
30p MUP -0.1% -0.1% -0.2% -0.2% 
40p MUP -0.3% -0.2% -0.1% -0.7% 
50p MUP 0.7% 0.5% 1.2% 0.2% 
60p MUP 3.0% 2.2% 4.2% 2.3% 
70p MUP 5.2% 4.1% 7.2% 3.4% 
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Table 4.9: Estimated impact of MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker group and poverty group 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
    
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Drinker population 345,308 2,314,021 83,404 758,402 31,248 208,089 
Baseline spending per drinker per year £230 £378 £1,102 £1,204 £2,484 £2,341 
    
    
  
Absolute change per 
drinker per year 
30p MUP -£1 £0 -£4 -£2 -£29 £0 
40p MUP -£2 £0 -£7 -£1 -£83 -£7 
50p MUP £0 £2 £1 £16 -£88 £20 
60p MUP £1 £9 £21 £54 -£121 £81 
70p MUP £2 £17 £30 £92 -£254 £131 
    
    
  
Relative change per 
drinker per year 
30p MUP -0.4% -0.1% -0.3% -0.2% -1.2% 0.0% 
40p MUP -0.7% -0.1% -0.7% -0.1% -3.3% -0.3% 
50p MUP -0.2% 0.6% 0.1% 1.4% -3.5% 0.8% 
60p MUP 0.5% 2.3% 1.9% 4.4% -4.9% 3.5% 
70p MUP 0.7% 4.4% 2.7% 7.6% -10.2% 5.6% 
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Figure 4.13: Absolute changes in consumer spending under a 50 MUP by drinker and poverty group 
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Figure 4.12: Absolute changes in consumer spending under MUP policies by 
drinker group 
55 
 
4.2.3 Estimated impact of MUP on exchequer and retailer revenue 
The estimated impact of all modelled MUP policies on annual revenue to the exchequer from alcohol 
taxation and on annual revenue to retailers from alcohol sales, after accounting for tax, separated 
into the on- and off-trades is presented in Table 4.10. Exchequer impact is shown visually in Figure 
4.14, with retailer revenue shown similarly in Figure 4.15. 
These results show a clear pattern across all modelled MUP thresholds. At all levels revenue to the 
exchequer is expected to decrease (e.g. a £15m reduction per year for a 50p MUP), with larger 
decreases for higher MUPs. The impact on revenue from the on-trade is similar across all MUP 
thresholds, with the increases coming entirely from off-trade taxation. For all modelled MUP policies 
above 30p, revenue to retailers is expected to increase overall. Revenue in the on-trade is estimated 
to decrease slightly (e.g. £7m per year, a 0.7% reduction, for a 50p MUP) while off-trade revenue 
increases substantially (e.g. £41m per year, a 9.6% increase for a 50p MUP). This is because, 
although prices in the on-trade are unaffected, the cross-price elasticities in Table 3.2 mean that 
changes in off-trade prices lead to a slight reduction in total sales volumes. In the off-trade, total 
sales volumes decrease as consumers purchase less alcohol, however this is offset by the additional 
revenue gained due to the higher prices following the implementation of the MUP. As for exchequer 
revenue the impact on the on-trade is similar across all modelled MUP thresholds, while the gains 
for the on-trade increase significantly at higher MUPs. 
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Table 4.10: Estimated impact of MUP policies on exchequer revenue and retailer revenue 
 
Estimated change in duty & VAT 
revenue to Government 
Estimated change in revenue to 
retailers (after accounting for 
duty & VAT) 
Off-trade On-trade Total Off-trade On-trade Total 
Baseline receipts (£ million) 666 469 1,136 428 961 1,389 
    
Absolute change in 
revenue per annum 
(£ million) 
30p MUP -1 -2 -2 2 -3 -1 
40p MUP -5 -4 -9 8 -7 2 
50p MUP -12 -4 -15 41 -7 34 
60p MUP -18 -3 -22 105 -7 98 
70p MUP -30 -5 -35 175 -10 165 
    
Relative change in 
revenue per annum 
30p MUP -0.1% -0.4% -0.2% 0.6% -0.4% -0.1% 
40p MUP -0.8% -0.8% -0.8% 2.0% -0.7% 0.1% 
50p MUP -1.8% -0.7% -1.3% 9.6% -0.7% 2.5% 
60p MUP -2.8% -0.7% -1.9% 24.6% -0.7% 7.1% 
70p MUP -4.5% -1.1% -3.1% 40.9% -1.1% 11.9% 
 
 
Figure 4.14: Changes in annual exchequer revenue under MUP policies 
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Figure 4.15: Changes in annual retailer revenue under MUP policies 
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Table 4.11: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on health outcomes at full effect 
 
Policy impact on deaths per 
year (full effect) 
Policy impact on hospital 
admissions per year (full effect) 
Acute Chronic Total Acute Chronic Total 
Baseline level of alcohol-
attributable harm per year 
743 883 1,626 25,631 4,236 29,867 
    
Absolute change 
30p MUP -3 -10 -13 -85 -170 -255 
40p MUP -11 -38 -49 -312 -607 -919 
50p MUP -28 -93 -121 -779 -1,263 -2,042 
60p MUP -56 -181 -236 -1,524 -2,288 -3,812 
70p MUP -90 -303 -393 -2,512 -3,803 -6,315 
    
Relative change 
30p MUP -0.4% -1.1% -0.8% -0.3% -4.0% -0.9% 
40p MUP -1.5% -4.3% -3.0% -1.2% -14.3% -3.1% 
50p MUP -3.8% -10.5% -7.4% -3.0% -29.8% -6.8% 
60p MUP -7.5% -20.5% -14.5% -5.9% -54.0% -12.8% 
70p MUP -12.1% -34.3% -24.2% -9.8% -89.8% -21.1% 
 
 
Figure 4.16: Changes in deaths under MUP policies by condition type 
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Figure 4.17: Changes in hospital admissions under MUP policies by condition type 
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Table 4.12: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on death and hospital admission rates by drinker 
group 
 
Policy impact on deaths per 
100,000 drinkers per year (full 
effect) 
Policy impact on hospital 
admissions per 100,000 drinkers 
per year (full effect) 
Moderate Hazardous Harmful Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
Baseline level of alcohol-
attributable harm per year 
-7 95 424 -100 1,839 7,120 
    
Absolute change 
30p MUP 0 -1 -3 -1 -9 -66 
40p MUP 0 -2 -13 -2 -33 -243 
50p MUP 0 -5 -30 -5 -84 -497 
60p MUP 0 -11 -57 -12 -168 -865 
70p MUP -1 -18 -93 -22 -285 -1,393 
    
Relative change 
30p MUP 0.3% -0.6% -0.8% 0.8% -0.5% -0.9% 
40p MUP 1.0% -2.2% -3.0% 2.4% -1.8% -3.4% 
50p MUP 2.1% -5.7% -7.0% 5.5% -4.6% -7.0% 
60p MUP 4.8% -11.5% -13.3% 12.3% -9.1% -12.2% 
70p MUP 8.3% -19.4% -22.0% 21.8% -15.5% -19.6% 
 
 
Figure 4.18: Changes in death rates under MUP policies by drinker group 
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harmful drinkers in poverty, with an estimated 119 deaths per year averted per 100,000 harmful 
drinkers in poverty under a 50p MUP, compared to 16 deaths averted per 100,000 harmful drinkers 
not in poverty. Similar patterns are observed for hospital admissions. Graphs illustrating the impact 
on deaths and admissions of all modelled MUP policies can be found in the Appendix, Figure 7.8 and 
Figure 7.9. 
Table 4.13: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on death rates by drinker and poverty group 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
    
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Baseline alcohol-attributable 
deaths per year per 100,000 
drinkers 
1 -8 206 83 781 371 
    
    
  
Absolute change 
in deaths per 
100,000 
drinkers per 
year 
30p MUP 0 0 -2 0 -19 -1 
40p MUP 0 0 -8 -1 -59 -6 
50p MUP -1 0 -22 -4 -119 -16 
60p MUP -1 0 -40 -8 -202 -35 
70p MUP -2 0 -60 -14 -314 -60 
    
    
  
Relative change 
in deaths per 
100,000 
drinkers per 
year 
30p MUP -19.0% 0.1% -0.9% -0.5% -2.4% -0.3% 
40p MUP -41.3% 0.4% -4.1% -1.7% -7.6% -1.5% 
50p MUP -83.0% 0.9% -10.8% -4.4% -15.3% -4.4% 
60p MUP -161.8% 2.5% -19.6% -9.3% -25.8% -9.4% 
70p MUP -211.2% 5.2% -29.0% -16.7% -40.2% -16.3% 
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Table 4.14: Estimated impacts of MUP policies on hospital admission rates by drinker and poverty 
group 
  
Moderate Hazardous Harmful 
    
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Baseline alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions per year per 
100,000 drinkers 
103 -130 4,563 1,539 11,555 6,454 
    
    
  
Absolute change 
in admissions 
per 100,000 
drinkers per 
year 
30p MUP -4 0 -31 -7 -289 -33 
40p MUP -11 -1 -138 -21 -822 -156 
50p MUP -22 -3 -359 -54 -1,440 -356 
60p MUP -44 -7 -653 -115 -2,292 -651 
70p MUP -65 -15 -985 -208 -3,570 -1,066 
    
    
  
Relative change 
in admissions 
per 100,000 
drinkers per 
year 
30p MUP -4.3% 0.2% -0.7% -0.4% -2.5% -0.5% 
40p MUP -10.3% 0.9% -3.0% -1.4% -7.1% -2.4% 
50p MUP -21.9% 2.2% -7.9% -3.5% -12.5% -5.5% 
60p MUP -43.1% 5.8% -14.3% -7.5% -19.8% -10.1% 
70p MUP -62.9% 11.8% -21.6% -13.5% -30.9% -16.5% 
 
 
Figure 4.19: Changes in hospital admission rates under a 50p MUP by drinker and poverty group 
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As discussed in Section 3.4.3, the full effect of a MUP is not expected to be realised until 20 years 
following policy implementation. Table 4.15 shows the estimated ‘partial effects’ in terms of 
reductions in deaths and hospital admissions estimated in years 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20. Figure 4.20 
shows the estimated change in deaths by condition type across the 20 years prior to full effect. 
These results show that, for a 50p MUP, 58 deaths are estimated to be avoided in the year 
immediately following policy implementation, 93 in the 5th year, 102 in the 10th and 115 in the 15th. 
Equivalently, 77% of the full impact of the policy on deaths and 93% of the full impact on hospital 
admissions is estimated to be achieved by the 5th year following implementation. Figure 4.20 
highlights differences in the types of harms averted over time, with gains in acute conditions 
expected to accrue immediately, while those from chronic conditions take longer to develop due to 
the ‘time lags’ between reductions in consumption and reductions in corresponding risks of harm. 
 
Table 4.15: Estimated 'partial effects' - impacts of MUP policies on deaths and hospital admissions in 
years 1, 5, 10, 15 and 20 
 
Change in deaths per year Change in hospital admissions per year 
 
Year 
1 
Year 
5 
Year 
10 
Year 
15 
Year 
20 
Year 1 Year 5 Year 10 Year 15 Year 20 
30p MUP -7 -11 -12 -13 -13 -158 -245 -263 -264 -255 
40p MUP -24 -39 -42 -47 -49 -564 -865 -934 -941 -919 
50p MUP -58 -93 -102 -115 -121 -1,299 -1,893 -2,033 -2,071 -2,042 
60p MUP -112 -180 -197 -223 -236 -2,463 -3,526 -3,769 -3,856 -3,812 
70p MUP -181 -293 -323 -369 -393 -4,012 -5,774 -6,195 -6,365 -6,315 
 
 
Figure 4.20: Impact of a 50p MUP on annual deaths over 20 years by condition type 
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Finally, Table 4.16 presents the cumulative impact across 5, 10, 15 and 20 years of all modelled MUP 
policies in terms of reductions in alcohol-related deaths and hospital admissions. These highlight the 
full extent of the estimated impact of MUP policies on health harms over time, with a 50p MUP 
estimated to avoid 392 alcohol-related deaths and 8,254 hospital admissions over the first 5 years 
following implementation and 2,036 deaths and 38,859 admissions over 20 years.  
 
Table 4.16: Estimated cumulative changes in deaths and hospital admissions under MUP policies 
 
Cumulative change in alcohol-related 
deaths following policy implementation 
Cumulative change in alcohol-related 
hospital admissions following policy 
implementation 
 
5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 5 years 10 years 15 years 20 years 
30p MUP -47 -104 -166 -231 -1,050 -2,344 -3,668 -4,961 
40p MUP -163 -370 -596 -839 -3,707 -8,293 -13,008 -17,654 
50p MUP -392 -890 -1,441 -2,036 -8,254 -18,245 -28,575 -38,859 
60p MUP -759 -1,722 -2,792 -3,951 -15,459 -34,014 -53,211 -72,391 
70p MUP -1,234 -2,810 -4,573 -6,497 -25,253 -55,716 -87,348 -119,077 
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4.3 EVALUATION OF TAXATION POLICIES EQUIVALENT TO A 50P MUP 
4.3.1 Equivalisation of taxation increases 
The results presented in Section 4.2 show the estimated impact of a range of MUP thresholds. In this 
section we focus on a 50p MUP and illustrate the increase in alcohol taxation which would be 
required to achieve the same impact across 5 separate measures: 
1. The total number of alcohol-related deaths averted in the population at full effect 
2. The total number of alcohol-related deaths averted in hazardous and harmful drinkers at full 
effect 
3. The total number of alcohol-related deaths averted in harmful drinkers at full effect 
4. The total number of alcohol-related deaths averted in hazardous and harmful drinkers in 
poverty at full effect 
5. The total number of alcohol-related deaths averted in harmful drinkers in poverty at full 
effect. 
As discussed in Section 3.2.7.2, tax rises are modelled as a flat percentage increase in current tax 
rates. Table 4.17 presents the results of the equivalisation process, showing the estimated reduction 
in alcohol-related deaths at full effect in all drinker and poverty groups, with coloured cells 
representing the equivalised pairs. The respective increases in taxation to achieve the 5 aims listed 
above would be as follows: 
1. 26.8% - henceforth 27% 
2. 28.1% - henceforth 28% 
3. 35.5% - henceforth 36% 
4. 54.8% - henceforth 55% 
5. 69.8% - henceforth 70%. 
It should be noted that these increases are substantially larger than any changes in alcohol taxation 
which have taken place in recent history within the UK. Duty rises over the last two decades have 
rarely exceeded 5% and only once exceeded 10%, when cider duty was increased by over 13% in 
2010 – an increase which was reversed a few months later. 
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Table 4.17: Equivalisation of mortality impacts of taxation increases with a 50p MUP 
 
Baseline 
deaths per 
year 
Change in annual deaths attributable to alcohol at full effect 
Drinker group Income group 
50p MUP 
27% tax 
rise 
28% tax 
rise 
36% tax 
rise 
55% tax 
rise 
70% tax 
rise 
Consumption breakdown   
All drinkers All incomes 1,626 -121 -121 -127 -162 -255 -330 
Moderate All incomes -188 -4 -10 -10 -13 -20 -26 
Hazardous All incomes 798 -46 -59 -61 -78 -122 -157 
Harmful All incomes 1,016 -71 -53 -56 -71 -113 -146 
Hazardous and harmful All incomes 1,814 -117 -111 -117 -149 -235 -304 
Income group breakdown   
All drinkers 
In poverty 419 -58 -30 -31 -39 -61 -79 
Not in poverty 1,207 -63 -92 -96 -123 -194 -251 
Moderate 
In poverty 3 -2 -3 -3 -4 -6 -7 
Not in poverty -190 -2 -7 -7 -9 -15 -19 
Hazardous 
In poverty 172 -19 -13 -14 -18 -27 -35 
Not in poverty 626 -27 -45 -48 -61 -95 -123 
Harmful 
In poverty 244 -37 -14 -14 -18 -29 -37 
Not in poverty 772 -34 -39 -41 -53 -84 -109 
Hazardous and harmful 
In poverty 416 -56 -27 -28 -36 -56 -72 
Not in poverty 1,398 -61 -85 -89 -114 -179 -232 
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4.3.2 Comparison of estimated impact of tax and MUP on consumption 
Detailed relative and absolute estimates of the comparative impact of a 50p MUP and all 5 modelled 
taxation policies on alcohol consumption by drinker and poverty groups are given in Table 4.18. 
Absolute impacts on consumption by drinker group are illustrated in Figure 4.21 and further broken 
down by drinker and poverty group in Figure 4.22. These results show that a 50p MUP has a smaller 
impact on consumption of moderate and hazardous drinkers than any of the modelled taxation 
policies, but a greater impact on the consumption of harmful drinkers than all but the two largest tax 
increases. If we look further at harmful drinkers in poverty, the group who consume the most and 
suffer the highest rates of alcohol-related harm, then a 50p MUP is estimated to have a greater 
impact than any of the modelled taxation policies. Comparing a 50p MUP with a 28% tax rise we see 
that MUP has a greater impact on the consumption of hazardous drinkers in poverty (-88 vs. -60 
units per year) but a lesser impact on hazardous drinkers not in poverty (-30 units vs. -43 per year). 
The difference is more striking in harmful drinkers in poverty for whom a 50p MUP is estimated to 
reduce consumption by 681 units per year compared to 253 units under a 28% tax rise. MUP is also 
expected to have a greater impact on harmful drinkers who are not in poverty, reducing their 
consumption by 181 units per year compared to 139 under a 28% tax rise. 
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Table 4.18: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on consumption by drinker and poverty group 
 
Baseline 
consumption 
per drinker 
per year 
Absolute change in annual units consumed per drinker Relative change in annual units consumed per drinker 
Drinker group Income group 
50p 
MUP 
27% 
tax rise 
28% 
tax rise 
36% 
tax rise 
55% 
tax rise 
70% 
tax rise 
50p 
MUP 
27% 
tax 
rise 
28% 
tax 
rise 
36% 
tax 
rise 
55% 
tax 
rise 
70% 
tax 
rise 
Consumption breakdown   
All drinkers All incomes 761 -26 -25 -26 -33 -52 -67 -3.5% -3.2% -3.4% -4.3% -6.8% -8.8% 
Moderate All incomes 312 -4 -8 -8 -10 -16 -21 -1.2% -2.5% -2.6% -3.3% -5.3% -6.8% 
Hazardous All incomes 1,402 -36 -43 -45 -57 -91 -118 -2.5% -3.1% -3.2% -4.1% -6.5% -8.4% 
Harmful All incomes 3,498 -246 -147 -154 -196 -308 -399 -7.0% -4.2% -4.4% -5.6% -8.8% -11.4% 
Income group breakdown   
All drinkers 
In poverty 748 -70 -33 -35 -44 -69 -89 -9.3% -4.4% -4.6% -5.9% -9.2% -11.8% 
Not in poverty 763 -20 -23 -25 -31 -49 -64 -2.7% -3.1% -3.2% -4.1% -6.5% -8.4% 
Moderate 
In poverty 238 -10 -8 -9 -11 -17 -22 -4.1% -3.5% -3.7% -4.7% -7.3% -9.4% 
Not in poverty 323 -3 -8 -8 -10 -16 -21 -0.8% -2.4% -2.5% -3.2% -5.0% -6.6% 
Hazardous 
In poverty 1,456 -88 -57 -60 -76 -119 -153 -6.1% -3.9% -4.1% -5.2% -8.2% -10.5% 
Not in poverty 1,396 -30 -41 -43 -55 -87 -114 -2.1% -3.0% -3.1% -4.0% -6.3% -8.1% 
Harmful 
In poverty 4,499 -681 -241 -253 -321 -503 -648 -15.1% -5.4% -5.6% -7.1% -11.2% -14.4% 
Not in poverty 3,348 -181 -132 -139 -177 -279 -362 -5.4% -4.0% -4.2% -5.3% -8.3% -10.8% 
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Figure 4.21: Absolute changes in consumption under taxation and MUP policies by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.22: Absolute changes in consumption under taxation and MUP policies by drinker and 
poverty group 
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4.3.3 Comparison of estimated impact of tax and MUP on prices 
Figure 4.23 illustrates the estimated comparative impact of a 50p MUP and modelled tax rises on 
alcohol prices. Note that these represent the new prices paid before changes in consumption occur 
as a result of the changes in price. This illustrates that while the 50p MUP has a substantial impact 
on prices at the cheaper end of the market (where heavier drinkers purchase more of their alcohol, 
as shown in Section 4.1.1), taxation increases affect the price of all products across the entire price 
spectrum. The figure also highlights that even under the highest modelled tax increases, very cheap 
(i.e. below 30p/unit) alcohol is still likely to be available, which is not the case under a 50p MUP. 
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Figure 4.23: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on alcohol prices 
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4.3.4 Comparison of estimated impact of tax and MUP on spending 
Table 4.19 presents detailed absolute and relative impacts of a 50p MUP and modelled tax increases 
broken down by drinker and poverty group. These results are illustrated by drinker group in Figure 
4.24 and by drinker and poverty group in Figure 4.25. Unlike for a 50p MUP alone (see Section 4.2.2), 
the conclusions here are clear – all modelled taxation policies increase spending across all groups 
and these increases are considerably larger than under a 50p MUP (e.g. £17 per year under a 28% 
tax rise vs. £2 under a 50p MUP for moderate drinkers and £152 per year vs. £6 respectively for 
harmful drinkers). When we break results down by drinker and poverty group we see an even 
starker contrast for harmful drinkers in poverty, for whom a 50p MUP is estimated to lead to an £88 
reduction in annual spending, compared to a £164 increase under a 28% tax rise. The differences 
arise from the fact (as seen in Figure 4.23) that taxation increases affect the price of all products and 
broadly maintain the relative price of different beverage types, while a 50p MUP affects only the 
price of cheap products, but to a greater extent, and thus changes the relative price of different 
beverage types.   
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Table 4.19: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on consumer spending by drinker and poverty group 
 
Baseline 
spending 
per 
drinker 
per year 
Absolute change in annual spending on alcohol per 
drinker 
Relative change in annual spending on alcohol per 
drinker 
Drinker 
group Income group 
50p 
MUP 
27% 
tax rise 
28% tax 
rise 
36% 
tax rise 
55% 
tax rise 
70% 
tax rise 
50p 
MUP 
27% 
tax rise 
28% 
tax rise 
36% 
tax rise 
55% 
tax rise 
70% 
tax rise 
Consumption breakdown   
All drinkers All incomes £675 £5 £37 £39 £48 £71 £87 0.7% 5.5% 5.8% 7.2% 10.5% 12.9% 
Moderate All incomes £359 £2 £16 £17 £21 £31 £38 0.5% 4.4% 4.7% 5.8% 8.6% 10.6% 
Hazardous All incomes £1,194 £15 £74 £77 £96 £142 £175 1.2% 6.2% 6.5% 8.1% 11.9% 14.6% 
Harmful All incomes £2,360 £6 £145 £152 £187 £270 £326 0.2% 6.2% 6.4% 7.9% 11.4% 13.8% 
Income group breakdown   
All drinkers 
In poverty £541 -£6 £30 £32 £39 £56 £68 -1.1% 5.6% 5.9% 7.2% 10.4% 12.6% 
Not in poverty £694 £7 £38 £40 £50 £73 £90 1.0% 5.5% 5.8% 7.2% 10.6% 13.0% 
Moderate 
In poverty £230 £0 £11 £11 £14 £20 £25 -0.2% 4.7% 4.9% 6.0% 8.9% 10.8% 
Not in poverty £378 £2 £17 £18 £22 £32 £40 0.6% 4.4% 4.6% 5.8% 8.6% 10.6% 
Hazardous 
In poverty £1,102 £1 £65 £68 £83 £121 £147 0.1% 5.9% 6.1% 7.6% 11.0% 13.3% 
Not in poverty £1,204 £16 £75 £78 £98 £144 £178 1.4% 6.2% 6.5% 8.1% 12.0% 14.8% 
Harmful 
In poverty £2,484 -£88 £157 £164 £201 £283 £334 -3.5% 6.3% 6.6% 8.1% 11.4% 13.5% 
Not in poverty £2,341 £20 £143 £150 £185 £268 £324 0.8% 6.1% 6.4% 7.9% 11.5% 13.9% 
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Figure 4.24: Absolute changes in spending under taxation and MUP policies by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.25: Absolute changes in spending under taxation and MUP policies by drinker and poverty 
group 
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4.3.5 Comparison of estimated impact of tax and MUP on exchequer and retailer 
revenue 
Table 4.20 shows the comparative impact of a 50p MUP and modelled taxation increases on revenue 
to the exchequer and retailers, broken down by on-and off-trade revenue. As illustrated in Figure 
4.26 for the exchequer and Figure 4.27 for retailers, the differences are striking. A 50p MUP is 
estimated to lead to a modest reduction in revenue from alcohol taxation to the exchequer of £15m 
(a 1.3% cut), compared to an increase of £209m (an 18% increase) from a 28% tax rise. In contrast a 
50p MUP is estimated to increase retailer revenue by £34m per annum (+2.5%) while a 28% tax rise 
would reduce it by £63m.  
The distribution of impacts on retailer revenue are also significant, with MUP estimated to reduce 
on-trade revenues slightly (-0.7%) while increasing off-trade revenues (+9.6%). In contrast a tax 
increase affects both on- and off-trades similarly in absolute terms (-£30m and -£31m for a 28% tax 
rise), with a larger absolute impact in the off-trade (-7.7% vs. -3.2% for a 28% tax rise). These 
differences are due to the fundamental differences in the way that the two policies operate. Under a 
MUP the majority of the increase in price paid for products previously sold below 50p per unit goes 
to the retailer, and the price of products sold above 50p per unit is unaffected, while a tax rise 
affects the price of all products and all additional revenue goes to the exchequer. 
 
Table 4.20: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on exchequer and retailer revenue 
 
Estimated change in duty & 
VAT revenue to Government 
Estimated change in revenue to 
retailers (after accounting for 
duty & VAT) 
Off-trade On-trade Total Off-trade On-trade Total 
Baseline receipts per annum (£ 
million) 
666 469 1,136 428 961 1,389 
    
Absolute change in 
revenue per annum 
(£ million) 
50p MUP -12 -4 -15 41 -7 34 
27% tax rise 141 16 199 -31 -29 -60 
28% tax rise 148 16 209 -33 -30 -63 
36% tax rise 184 21 261 -41 -38 -79 
55% tax rise 270 31 385 -61 -58 -119 
70% tax rise 335 38 479 -79 -74 -153 
    
Relative change in 
revenue per annum 
50p MUP -1.8% -0.7% -1.3% 9.6% -0.7% 2.5% 
27% tax rise 21.1% 3.3% 17.6% -7.3% -3.0% -4.3% 
28% tax rise 22.2% 3.5% 18.4% -7.7% -3.2% -4.6% 
36% tax rise 27.6% 4.4% 22.9% -9.6% -4.0% -5.7% 
55% tax rise 40.6% 6.5% 33.9% -14.2% -6.0% -8.6% 
70% tax rise 50.3% 8.2% 42.2% -18.3% -7.7% -11.0% 
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Figure 4.26: Changes in exchequer revenue under taxation and MUP policies 
 
 
Figure 4.27 Changes in retailer revenue under taxation and MUP policies 
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4.3.6 Comparison of estimated impact of tax and MUP on health outcomes 
Table 4.21 presents detailed estimates of the comparative impacts of a 50p MUP and modelled 
taxation increases on annual alcohol-related death rates by drinker and poverty group. Figure 4.28 
illustrates the comparative impact by drinker group, while Figure 4.29 further breaks this down by 
drinker and poverty group. Overall we see similar patterns to the consumption results in Section 
4.3.2, with MUP having a lesser impact on moderate and hazardous and a greater impact on harmful 
drinkers, particularly so on harmful drinkers in poverty. Results for hospital admissions are shown in 
Table 4.22 and show similar patterns, as can be seen in Figure 7.10 in the Appendix. 
 
Table 4.21: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on mortality rates by drinker and poverty 
group 
 
Baseline 
annual 
deaths 
per 
100,000 
drinkers 
Change in annual deaths attributable to alcohol per 100,000 
drinkers at full effect 
Drinker 
group Income group 
50p 
MUP 
27% tax 
rise 
28% tax 
rise 
36% tax 
rise 
55% tax 
rise 
70% tax 
rise 
Consumption breakdown 
All drinkers All incomes 43 -3 -3 -3 -4 -7 -9 
Moderate All incomes -7 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Hazardous All incomes 95 -5 -7 -7 -9 -15 -19 
Harmful All incomes 424 -30 -22 -23 -30 -47 -61 
Income group breakdown 
All drinkers 
In poverty 91 -13 -6 -7 -9 -13 -17 
Not in poverty 37 -2 -3 -3 -4 -6 -8 
Moderate 
In poverty 1 -1 -1 -1 -1 -2 -2 
Not in poverty -8 0 0 0 0 -1 -1 
Hazardous 
In poverty 206 -22 -16 -17 -21 -33 -42 
Not in poverty 83 -4 -6 -6 -8 -13 -16 
Harmful 
In poverty 781 -119 -44 -46 -58 -92 -119 
Not in poverty 371 -16 -19 -20 -25 -40 -52 
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Figure 4.28: Changes in alcohol-related death rates under taxation and MUP policies by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.29: Changes in alcohol-related death rates under taxation and MUP policies by drinker and 
poverty group 
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Table 4.22: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on hospital admission rates by drinker 
and poverty group 
 
Baseline 
annual 
admissions 
per 100,000 
drinkers 
Change in annual hospital admissions attributable to 
alcohol per 100,000 drinkers at full effect 
Drinker 
group Income group 
50p 
MUP 
27% 
tax rise 
28% 
tax rise 
36% 
tax rise 
55% 
tax rise 
70% 
tax rise 
Consumption breakdown 
All drinkers All incomes 798 -55 -62 -64 -81 -123 -158 
Moderate All incomes -100 -5 -12 -12 -16 -25 -32 
Hazardous All incomes 1,839 -84 -103 -108 -138 -217 -281 
Harmful All incomes 7,120 -497 -469 -488 -605 -893 -1,123 
Income group breakdown 
All drinkers 
In poverty 1,689 -180 -108 -113 -144 -218 -278 
Not in poverty 674 -37 -55 -58 -72 -110 -141 
Moderate 
In poverty 103 -22 -25 -26 -33 -51 -65 
Not in poverty -130 -3 -10 -10 -13 -21 -27 
Hazardous 
In poverty 4,563 -359 -252 -264 -335 -521 -669 
Not in poverty 1,539 -54 -87 -91 -116 -184 -238 
Harmful 
In poverty 11,555 -1,440 -641 -667 -861 -1,253 -1,578 
Not in poverty 6,454 -356 -443 -462 -567 -839 -1,055 
 
Figure 4.30 illustrates the profile of impact of a 28% tax rise on alcohol-related mortality and shows 
that this is very similar to the profile for a 50p MUP. There are, however, some differences in the 
health conditions from which deaths are averted between the two policies, with a 50p MUP having a 
greater impact on deaths from alcoholic liver disease, while a 28% tax rise leads to greater 
reductions in cardiovascular mortality. These differences are shown in Figure 7.11 in the Appendix. 
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Figure 4.30: Comparison of impact over time of a 50p MUP and a 28% tax rise 
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in alcohol-related mortality rates between those in poverty and those not in poverty. Figure 4.31 
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Table 4.23: Estimated impacts of taxation and MUP policies on alcohol-related health inequalities 
  
Drinkers in 
poverty 
Drinkers not 
in poverty 
Inequality 'gap' 
Deaths per 
100,000 
drinkers 
per year 
Baseline 91 37 54 
50p MUP 78 35 44 
27% tax rise 85 34 51 
28% tax rise 84 34 50 
36% tax rise 82 33 49 
55% tax rise 78 31 47 
70% tax rise 74 29 45 
 
 
Figure 4.31: Reduction in the size of the 'Inequality gap' in alcohol-related deaths under taxation and 
MUP policies 
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4.4 SENSITIVITY ANALYSES 
Table 4.24 shows the absolute and relative impact on the estimated effect of a 50p MUP on 
consumption, spending, alcohol-related deaths and alcohol-related hospital admissions. We can see 
here that SA1, the adjustment of the SHeS survey data to account for underreporting, affects the 
baseline levels of consumption and spending as well as the modelled impacts of the policy. We can 
also see that SA3, where protective effects are removed from the model, affects only the harm 
outcomes and not the consumption and spending results, as we would expect. 
Overall, accounting for underreporting (SA1) and using HMRC elasticities (SA2), both lead to larger 
estimates of reductions in consumption, both absolutely and relatively. SA1 does not change the 
spending results substantially, but SA2 reverses the estimated direction of effect, with a 50p MUP 
now estimated to save drinkers £5.49 per year on average, although the magnitude of this effect is 
still small (<1%). As for consumption, SA1 and SA2 both increase the estimated absolute and relative 
reductions in alcohol-related mortality and hospital admissions compared to the base case. SA3, 
where protective effects are removed from the model, leads to larger estimates of baseline harm 
than the base case (as alcohol is no longer protecting those drinking at low levels from some health 
conditions), but marginally smaller absolute (and thus significantly smaller relative) reductions in 
harm.  
Table 4.25 breaks these results down further by drinker group, to explore how the alternative 
assumptions alter the distribution of effects across the population. These findings are shown visually 
in Figure 4.32 for consumption (note that SA3 is excluded as the impact on consumption is 
unchanged from baseline in this scenario), Figure 4.33 for spending (again, SA3 is not shown), Figure 
4.34 for mortality and Figure 4.35 for hospital admissions. These results show that the overall 
distribution of effects across drinker groups is similar under all sensitivity analyses with two main 
exceptions. The first is the impact of using alternative elasticities on spending (SA2), where spending 
in all groups is estimated to reduce, with greater reductions in heavier drinkers. The second is the 
impact of adjusting for underreporting (SA1) on harm reductions, with alcohol-related mortality in 
harmful drinkers estimated to reduce by twice as much in the base case (62 fewer deaths per year 
per 100,000 drinkers vs. 30) and a similar conclusion for hospital admissions (1,064 fewer per year 
per 100,000 drinkers vs. 497). The effect on moderate and hazardous drinkers is considerably 
smaller and thus under SA1 a 50p MUP is estimated to be substantially more targeted at harmful 
drinkers in terms of harm reductions (i.e. they make up a greater proportion of the total reduction in 
harm).  
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Table 4.24: Impact of alternative assumptions on modelled effects of 50p MUP 
 
Baseline scenario 
SA1 (Adjustment for 
underreporting) 
SA2 (HMRC 
elasticities) 
SA3 (No protective 
effects) 
Baseline consumption (units per drinker per year) 761 1,254 761 761 
Absolute change in consumption (units per drinker per year) -26 -57 -37 -26 
Relative changes in consumption per drinker -3.5% -4.5% -4.8% -3.5% 
    
Baseline spending (per drinker per year) £675 £1,043 £675 £675 
Absolute change in spending (per drinker per year) £5.06 £5.59 -£5.49 £5.06 
Relative change in spending 0.7% 0.5% -0.8% 0.7% 
    
Baseline alcohol-related deaths (per year) 1,626 2,634 1,626 2,549 
Absolute change in alcohol-related deaths (per year) -121 -215 -196 -117 
Relative change in alcohol-related deaths -7.4% -8.2% -12.1% -4.6% 
    
Baseline alcohol-related hospital admissions (per year) 29,867 47,538 29,867 51,120 
Absolute change in alcohol-related hospital admissions (per year) -2,042 -3,720 -3,586 -1,958 
Relative change in alcohol-related hospital admissions -6.8% -7.8% -12.0% -3.8% 
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Table 4.25: Impact of alternative assumptions on modelled effects of 50p MUP by drinker group 
 
Consumption (units per 
drinker per year) 
 
Spending (per drinker 
per year) 
 
Alcohol-related deaths 
per 100,000 drinkers per 
year 
 
Alcohol-attributable 
hospital admissions (per 
100,000 drinkers per 
year) 
Baseline 
Absolute 
change 
Baseline 
Absolute 
change 
Baseline 
Absolute 
change 
Baseline 
Absolute 
change 
Moderate 
Baseline 312 -4 359 2 -7 0 -100 -5 
Underreporting (SA1) 363 -5 422 1 -9 0 -161 -5 
HMRC Elasticities (SA2) 312 -8 359 -3 -7 0 -100 -13 
No protective effects (SA3) 312 -4 359 2 17 0 453 -7 
Hazardous 
Baseline 1,402 -36 1,194 15 95 -5 1,839 -84 
Underreporting (SA1) 1,500 -45 1,291 13 94 -7 1,838 -125 
HMRC Elasticities (SA2) 1,402 -65 1,194 -10 95 -11 1,839 -166 
No protective effects (SA3) 1,402 -36 1,194 15 127 -5 2,582 -85 
Harmful 
Baseline 3,498 -246 2,360 6 424 -30 7,120 -497 
Underreporting (SA1) 3,644 -247 2,556 6 866 -62 15,185 -1,064 
HMRC Elasticities (SA2) 3,498 -249 2,360 -19 424 -38 7,120 -773 
No protective effects (SA3) 3,498 -246 2,360 6 425 -28 7,241 -440 
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Figure 4.32: Sensitivity analysis effects on consumption impacts of 50p MUP by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.33: Sensitivity analysis effects on spending impacts of 50p MUP by drinker group 
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Figure 4.34: Sensitivity analysis effects on mortality impacts of 50p MUP by drinker group 
 
 
Figure 4.35: Sensitivity analysis effects on hospital admission impacts of 50p MUP by drinker group
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5 SUMMARY OF RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
 
5.1 SUMMARY OF KEY FINDINGS 
The analyses presented in this report suggest that a 50p MUP is an effective approach to reducing 
alcohol consumption and alcohol-related harm. Alcohol consumption in Scotland is estimated to fall 
by 3.5% following introduction of the policy. This would lead to an estimated 2,040 fewer alcohol-
related deaths and 38,900 fewer hospital admissions in the first 20 years of the policy.  
MUP is also a well-targeted policy with the largest consumption reductions seen among hazardous 
and, particularly, harmful drinkers. These targeted reductions occur because a 50p MUP imposes 
large price increases on the low cost alcohol which is disproportionately purchased by the heaviest 
consumers. Moderate drinkers would experience only small impacts on their alcohol consumption as 
a result of introducing a 50p MUP. This is because they tend to buy alcohol which would be subject 
to little or no increase in price following the introduction of the policy.  
To achieve the same reduction in alcohol-related deaths among hazardous and harmful drinkers as a 
50p MUP, a 28% increase in alcohol taxation would be required. Although still effective in reducing 
alcohol-related mortality, a 28% tax increase is less well-targeted when compared to a 50p MUP. It is 
estimated to lead to smaller consumption reductions among harmful drinkers, who are at greatest 
health risk, and larger consumption reductions among hazardous and moderate drinkers (who are at 
proportionately less health risk).  
Impacts on consumer spending also differ between a 50p MUP and a 28% tax increase. While 
spending changes under a 50p MUP would be modest and would include a mixture of both spending 
increases and decreases within different population groups, changes would be larger under a 28% 
tax increase and spending would increase in all population groups.  
 
5.2 NEW ANALYSES RELATED TO INCOME GROUPS 
This report presents the first income-specific results from the Scottish adaptation of SAPM and 
provides further evidence of the targeted nature of MUP. Three key points emerge from these 
results. 
First, alcohol-related mortality and morbidity are particularly concentrated within hazardous and 
harmful drinkers with low incomes, making them a key target for policies aiming to reduce 
population levels of alcohol-related harm. A 50p MUP is estimated to impact on both drinkers in 
poverty and those not in poverty; however, the largest consumption reductions are estimated to 
occur among harmful drinkers in poverty – the group at greatest risk from their drinking. Substantial 
consumption reductions are estimated to also occur in other key groups including hazardous 
drinkers in poverty and harmful drinkers not in poverty. As above, this pattern of targeted effects 
arises from a 50p MUP imposing large price increases on the alcohol disproportionately purchased 
by hazardous and harmful drinkers, particularly those on lower incomes.  
Second, concerns have previously been expressed that MUP is a regressive policy which 
disproportionately affects low income drinkers (10). These new analyses suggest this claim requires 
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substantial qualification as, among those in poverty, it is only the drinking of hazardous and harmful 
drinkers which is affected to a large degree by the policy. These drinkers are at substantial risk from 
their alcohol consumption and the health benefits received from reduced alcohol consumption 
should be taken into account in any equity considerations. In contrast, moderate drinkers in poverty 
would be little affected by a 50p MUP as only small amounts of the alcohol they purchase is sold for 
less than 50p per unit.  
Third, reducing health inequalities is a major public health concern. By targeting alcohol 
consumption reductions, and thus reductions in alcohol-related mortality and morbidity, on heavier 
drinkers with lower incomes, reductions in health inequalities are likely to arise from a 50p MUP.  
 
5.3 NEW ANALYSES COMPARING A 50P MUP TO ALCOHOL TAXATION INCREASES  
This report illustrates the level of alcohol tax increases required to achieve the same impacts on 
alcohol-related mortality within specific population groups as a 50p MUP. Broadly, the results show 
that targeting groups at progressively higher risk from their drinking requires progressively larger tax 
increases to achieve the same reduction in alcohol-related mortality as a 50p MUP. For example, a 
28% tax increase would be required to achieve the same reduction in deaths among hazardous and 
harmful drinkers as a 50p MUP, a 36% tax increase would be required to achieve the same 
reductions in deaths among harmful drinkers and a 70% tax increase would be required to achieve 
the same reduction in deaths among harmful drinkers in poverty.  
These results are seen because, unlike the targeted price increases seen under MUP, raising alcohol 
taxes affects the price of alcohol consumed by all drinkers. If one wishes to reduce alcohol-related 
harm in a specific group within the population (e.g. harmful drinkers) then large tax increases are 
needed to produce large consumption (and thus harm) reductions within this smaller population. 
Such large tax increases will also affect those not within the target population.  
Tax increases also allow for more flexible responses by consumers and retailers to the policy. 
Whereas MUP requires alcohol to be sold above a particular price point, tax increases permit cheap 
alcohol to continue to be sold. This gives rise to two phenomena which impact the effectiveness of 
tax policies. First, tax increases may not directly translate into price increases. Previous analyses 
have shown that, when alcohol tax is increased in the UK, retailers increase the price of cheap 
products by less than would be expected given the tax increase and increase the price of expensive 
products by more than would be expected (18). These patterns of tax pass-through redirect price 
increases away from the cheap alcohol disproportionately purchased by those at greatest risk from 
their drinking and towards the more expensive alcohol which is purchased by those at least risk from 
their drinking. In so doing, this necessitates larger tax increases to achieve a given reduction in 
alcohol consumption. Second, heavier drinkers may trade-down to cheaper alcohol if products 
increase in price. This may occur to some extent under a 50p MUP with products currently sold 
above the 50p threshold, although the removal of very cheap alcohol from the market significantly 
limits the potential for this price substitution (as there is no cheaper alcohol to trade-down to). In 
contrast, taxation does not remove the cheapest alcohol from the market and as such hazardous and 
harmful drinkers who currently buy large amounts of cheap alcohol may be able to maintain their 
pre-tax increase consumption levels by trading down to still cheaper alcohol when prices go up (59). 
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This trading down effect is not directly accounted for within SAPM due to a lack of suitable data, 
however it should be noted that this may mean our results overstate, to some extent, the relative 
consumption reductions arising from taxation increases. 
Overall, although alcohol tax increases are an effective approach to reducing alcohol consumption 
and alcohol-related mortality and morbidity, the analyses above suggest they are a less well-
targeted and robust approach than MUP and, in particular, impose greater costs on drinkers whose 
alcohol consumption is low risk.  
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7 APPENDIX 
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Figure 7.1: Raw and adjusted off-trade price distributions by beverage type 
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Figure 7.2: Raw and adjusted on-trade price distributions by beverage type 
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Figure 7.3: Modelled time lag structures for selected health conditions from Holmes et al. 2012 
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Table 7.1: Annual mortality rates for all modelled health conditions 
Condition 
Deaths per 100,000 adults (aged 16-89) 
per year 
Population In poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome 
N/A6 
Degeneration 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy 
Alcoholic myopathy 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 0.21 0.52 0.16 
Alcoholic gastritis 0.02 0.00 0.03 
Alcoholic liver disease 15.03 30.19 12.75 
Actue pancreatitis (alcohol induced) 0.48 1.57 0.32 
Chronic pancreatitis (alcohol induced) 0.09 0.17 0.08 
Maternal care for (suspected) damage to fetus from alcohol N/A 
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol 6.35 14.31 5.15 
Excessive blood level of alcohol 
N/A 
Toxic effect of alcohol 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to alcohol 1.39 3.32 1.10 
Intentional self-poisoning by and and exposure to alcohol 0.05 0.00 0.05 
Poisoning by and exposure to alcohol, undetermined intent 
N/A 
Evidence of alcohol involvement determined by blood alcohol level 
Tuberculosis 0.57 1.05 0.50 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and pharynx 6.74 11.34 6.04 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus 18.45 21.81 17.95 
Malignant neoplasm of colon and rectum 32.27 36.29 31.67 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts 11.63 13.61 11.33 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx 2.35 4.71 2.00 
Malignant neoplasm of breast 20.56 19.19 20.76 
Diabetes mellitus (typeII) 16.26 19.89 15.72 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus 2.38 3.84 2.15 
Hypertensive diseases 8.93 9.95 8.78 
Ischaemic heart disease 133.29 174.32 127.11 
Cardiac arrhythmias 7.90 8.72 7.78 
Haemorrhagic and other non-ischaemic stroke 17.54 24.08 16.56 
Ischaemic stroke 38.35 40.31 38.05 
Lower respiratory infections: pneumonia 29.55 41.53 27.75 
Cirrhosis of the liver 3.68 6.63 3.23 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 2.42 3.49 2.26 
Transport injuries (including road traffic accidents) 4.93 5.58 4.84 
Fall injuries 11.97 11.52 12.04 
Exposure to mechanical forces (including machinery accidents) 0.14 0.00 0.16 
Drowning 0.50 0.17 0.55 
Other Unintentional Injuries 1.12 1.74 1.02 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to noxious substances 11.56 34.37 8.12 
Intentional self-harm 12.33 20.07 11.17 
Assault 1.10 1.92 0.97 
Other intentional injuries N/A 
 Overall mortality from alcohol-related conditions7 420.14 566.23 398.13 
Mortality from all other-causes 616.95 797.25 589.79 
 Overall mortality 1037.08 1363.48 987.93 
  
                                                          
6
 For some conditions, marked N/A, no deaths were recorded in Scotland in 2014 
7
 Note that this represents all deaths from the conditions included in the model, not just those which are 
attributable to alcohol (e.g. it includes all deaths from transport injuries, although many will not be 
attributable to alcohol) 
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Table 7.2: Annual hospital admissions for all modelled health conditions 
Condition Multiplier 
Hospital admissions per 100,000 
adults (aged 16-89) per year 
Population 
In 
poverty 
Not in 
poverty 
Alcohol-induced pseudo-Cushing's syndrome 1.00 N/A8 
Degeneration 1.10 0.89 1.57 0.79 
Alcoholic polyneuropathy 1.07 0.34 0.35 0.34 
Alcoholic myopathy 1.50 0.09 0.17 0.08 
Alcoholic cardiomyopathy 1.36 0.57 0.87 0.53 
Alcoholic gastritis 1.12 7.15 19.57 5.28 
Alcoholic liver disease 2.00 49.81 103.09 41.80 
Actue pancreatitis (alcohol induced) 1.00 5.82 14.33 4.55 
Chronic pancreatitis (alcohol induced) 1.42 2.01 4.72 1.60 
Maternal care for (suspected) damage to fetus from alcohol 1.00 N/A 
Mental and behavioural disorders due to use of alcohol 1.54 195.17 462.87 154.91 
Excessive blood level of alcohol 1.00 0.14 0.70 0.05 
Toxic effect of alcohol 1.12 47.69 91.56 41.09 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to alcohol 1.00 0.11 0.17 0.11 
Intentional self-poisoning by and and exposure to alcohol 1.00 0.27 0.52 0.24 
Poisoning by and exposure to alcohol, undetermined intent 1.00 N/A 
Evidence of alcohol involvement determined by blood alcohol level 1.25 0.09 0.00 0.11 
Tuberculosis 1.31 4.16 8.04 3.57 
Malignant neoplasm of lip, oral cavity and pharynx 2.65 26.75 40.01 24.75 
Malignant neoplasm of oesophagus 3.55 32.00 37.39 31.19 
Malignant neoplasm of colon and rectum 3.37 109.79 108.68 109.96 
Malignant neoplasm of liver and intrahepatic bile ducts 2.47 16.65 18.70 16.34 
Malignant neoplasm of larynx 2.29 8.79 17.65 7.46 
Malignant neoplasm of breast 3.85 141.15 121.09 144.17 
Diabetes mellitus (typeII) 1.61 539.11 733.88 509.82 
Epilepsy and status epilepticus 1.44 96.52 159.53 87.05 
Hypertensive diseases 1.29 607.38 568.93 613.16 
Ischaemic heart disease 1.52 877.23 1,105.71 842.87 
Cardiac arrhythmias 1.45 447.64 450.46 447.21 
Haemorrhagic and other non-ischaemic stroke 1.07 45.31 51.37 44.40 
Ischaemic stroke 1.17 224.22 300.89 212.69 
Lower respiratory infections: pneumonia 1.16 621.58 956.66 571.20 
Cirrhosis of the liver 1.62 24.35 36.69 22.49 
Acute and chronic pancreatitis 1.37 68.13 93.13 64.37 
Transport injuries (including road traffic accidents) 1.05 89.19 84.22 89.94 
Fall injuries 1.07 559.05 726.36 533.89 
Exposure to mechanical forces (including machinery accidents) 1.04 135.69 195.18 126.75 
Drowning 1.00 0.37 0.87 0.29 
Other Unintentional Injuries 1.02 29.46 26.04 29.98 
Accidental poisoning by exposure to noxious substances 1.04 41.91 92.96 34.24 
Intentional self-harm 1.26 132.65 266.47 112.53 
Assault 1.06 58.58 144.50 45.66 
Other intentional injuries 1.00 N/A 
 
All alcohol-related conditions 5,247.82 7,045.93 4,977.44 
  
                                                          
8
 For some health conditions, marked N/A, no hospital admissions were recorded in Scotland in 2014 
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Figure 7.4: Mean consumption, units purchased below 50p per unit and mean prices paid by consumption and poverty group 
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Figure 7.5: Baseline alcohol-related mortality rates by condition type and poverty group 
 
Figure 7.6: Absolute changes in consumption under MUP policies by drinker and poverty group 
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Figure 7.7: Absolute changes in spending under MUP policies by drinker and poverty group 
 
 
Figure 7.8: Absolute changes in alcohol-related deaths under MUP policies by drinker and poverty 
group 
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Figure 7.9: Absolute changes in alcohol-related hospital admission rates under MUP policies by 
drinker and poverty group 
 
 
Figure 7.10: Changes in alcohol-related hospital admissions under taxation and MUP policies by 
drinker and poverty group 
-4,000
-3,500
-3,000
-2,500
-2,000
-1,500
-1,000
-500
0
In poverty
Not in
poverty In poverty
Not in
poverty In poverty
Not in
poverty
Moderate Hazardous Harmful
A
b
so
lu
te
 c
h
an
ge
 in
 h
o
sp
it
al
 a
d
m
is
si
o
n
s 
p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 
d
ri
n
ke
rs
 p
e
r 
ye
ar
 
30p MUP
40p MUP
50p MUP
60p MUP
70p MUP
-1,800
-1,600
-1,400
-1,200
-1,000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
In poverty
Not in
poverty In poverty
Not in
poverty In poverty
Not in
poverty
Moderate Hazardous Harmful
A
b
so
lu
te
 c
h
an
ge
 in
 a
lc
o
h
o
l-
at
tr
ib
u
ta
b
le
 h
o
sp
it
al
 
ad
m
is
si
o
n
s 
p
e
r 
1
0
0
,0
0
0
 d
ri
n
ke
rs
 
50p MUP
27% tax rise
28% tax rise
36% tax rise
55% tax rise
70% tax rise
103 
 
 
 
Figure 7.11: Breakdown of deaths averted under 50p MUP and 28% tax by health condition 
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